

The US Policy on Women, Peace and Security

Interrogation of the Politics of Protection

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Every man I meet wants to protect me. I can't figure out what from.
(Mae West in Young 2003:1)

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Foreword

Policies on Women, Peace and Security were for the first time officially legitimized on the international agenda by the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in the year 2000. The launch of this resolution aimed to open for women the gate to the field of international relations which traditionally has been dominated by men and masculinized discourses. The responsibility to implement this agenda has since then rested on the international community more generally and on each and every of the UN Member States in particular, including the United States.

Resolution 1325 was considered a breakthrough due to a number of reasons. It was the very first document putting the issues of women and war on the agenda of the UN Security Council as a separate problem. It challenged the existing notions of security revealing their gender-blindness. It was seen as a radical shift from the masculinism of international relations. However, for me as a feminist and antiwar activist it was, first and foremost, a resolution addressing women primarily as autonomous agents and not exclusively as victims of violence in need of protection. Thus, the main aim of Resolution 1325, as I see it, was to give women a number of new opportunities in the context of conflict and post-conflict.

Nearly a year after the adoption of Resolution 1325 the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were crashed under the terrorist attack of September 11. The United States Government reacted with a particularly strong security alert. The terrorist attack apparently developed the not-new politics of protection as the governing rule in the US foreign policy more generally and particularly in regard to women. The US policy on Resolution 1325 which officially appeared only in December 2011 with the introduction of *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* by the Obama Administration seems to be an unusually intriguing case in this context.

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Barbara K. Trojanowska
Oslo, May 2013

Executive Summary

The thesis interrogates the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. This policy is based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions that address the situation of women in conflict and post-conflict settings. The main research question is as follows: How does the US policy involve the politics of protection?

The research is informed by feminist studies of international relations in general, and by the contributions of Wendy Brown (1995) and Iris Marion Young (2003) on the politics of protection in particular. The archive covers a collection of documents issued by the Federal Government of the United States but the textual priority is given to one particular text: *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* (2011). Through the analysis of this text, the thesis “reads off” the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. The problem representation is outlined and followed by the interrogation of this policy as discourse involving the politics of protection and specifically, formed under the logic of masculinist protection. The transformative potential of this policy is examined in regard to the objective of gender equality. The thesis further involves a juxtaposition of the US policy with the Norwegian policy on Women Peace and Security.

Although on the face of it the US policy on Resolution 1325 resembles the earlier policy on oppressed women in Afghanistan and Iraq that appeared shortly after the terrorist attack of 9/11 and justified military interventions in these countries, my empirical findings show that at the same time this policy is a distinct case and includes new elements. The politics of protection does not exhaust the understanding of this policy and the gender power relations produced within it appear to be more complicated. Although the dominant representations of men/masculinity, that is, the perpetrator of (sexual) violence and the provider of security, are consistent with the logic of masculinist protection, the representation of women/femininity differs. The US policy does not constitute women as only passive victims of violence who are in need of protection. Nevertheless, this representation is still based on the old generalizations about women as peaceful mothers, caregivers and actors of positive change. Ultimately, the space of autonomy remains limited. Finally, since the US policy constructs women as “different”, it is likely to reproduce instead of reducing gender inequalities.

INTRODUCTION

Research Question and Objective

The topic to be interrogated in the thesis is the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. This policy is based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions that together form the Women, Peace and Security agenda (www.peacewomen.org). The agenda addresses the situation of women in conflict and post-conflict settings. Resolution 1325 adopted in 2000 was the first official document recognizing the objective to mainstream a gender perspective in the context of conflict and post-conflict (Barnes 2011). The resolution was followed by the UN Security Council's call on the Member States to adopt national policy documents and in particular national action plans on Women, Peace and Security (www.peacewomen.org). In response to this call the Obama Administration launched in December 2011 *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* – the founding document for the US policy on Resolution 1325¹.

The thesis' goal is to analyze the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as reflected in the mentioned national action plan. The particular focus is on the politics of protection and the main research question is as follows:

How does the US policy involve the politics of protection?

Is this policy organized according to the logic of masculinist protection? Does the US policy produce women as autonomous subjects or rather as docile and regulated subjects? What kind of effects can this policy have on gender equality as an objective? These are yet other questions to be discussed. In my working definition of the politics of protection it refers to the power dynamics that involve (voluntary or forced) “exchange” of one's autonomy and freedoms for security (Brown 1995). The logic of masculinist protection may be considered a specific pattern of the politics of protection which in particular entails feminization of the

¹ I use “Resolution 1325” interchangeably with “Women, Peace and Security” and “the Women, Peace and Security agenda”. Resolution 1325 is a sort of umbrella for the following resolutions and thus, this usage is common in the field of international relations (www.peacewomen.org).

protected and masculinization of the protector that can, ultimately, contribute to male domination and female subordination (Brown 1995, Young 2003).

To be able to provide answer to the established research questions, I followed the methodological contributions of Carol Lee Bacchi (2000, 2009, Bacchi and Eveline 2010) and in particular: the set of six questions to interrogate a policy, the policy-as-discourse approach and the gender analysis procedures. The objective of the research is, therefore, threefold:

1. To “read off”² the US policy on Women, Peace and Security using Bacchi’s six questions;
2. To analyze this policy as discourse in the light of the politics of protection;
3. To discuss the transformative potential of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security using Bacchi’s division of gender analysis procedures into a differences model and a gender relations model.

The research further includes a juxtaposition of the US policy with the Norwegian policy on Resolution 1325 as formulated in *Norway’s Strategic Plan 2011-13: Women, Peace and Security*. Cross-cultural comparisons and juxtapositions are highly advisable in Bacchi’s methodology: according to the author, they are very fruitful tools to capture specificities of different policies and reflect upon power effects that can be derived from them.

Structure of the Thesis

The “Introduction” provides general information on Resolution 1325. In particular, I show the context in which Resolution 1325 appeared on the international agenda, the main objectives of the resolution as well as the levels of implementation of this document. The introductory part also discusses previous literature on Women, Peace and Security. The research strategy as well as fieldwork is outlined to the end.

“Chapter 1” provides theoretical framework for the interrogation of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. This chapter is organized around the problematization of the main notions

² By “reading off” a policy I mean investigating the assumptions and presuppositions that underpin it (for more see “Chapter 2”).

that appear in Resolution 1325. It starts with introducing feminist studies of international relations and investigating the influence of discourses on women/femininity and men/masculinity on the practices of war. The particular attention is paid to the evolution of the politics of protection. The notion of security is further problematized as the component that makes the politics of protection not only coherent but also justified. In addition, this chapter gives further information on Resolution 1325 as an advocacy tool to develop national action plans which are further addressed as creating both opportunities and risks for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.

“Chapter 2” discusses the methodological contributions by Carol Lee Bacchi (2000, 2009, Bacchi and Eveline 2010) and its application to the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. The “What’s the Problem Represented to Be?”-method and the set of six question to study policies are outlined. This chapter further focuses on the policy-as-discourse approach. I also reflect on different gender analysis procedures systematized by Bacchi and their effects on gender equality as an objective. Finally, my position as a researcher speaking from a particular location is critically addresses and the thesis’ challenges and constraints are highlighted.

In “Chapter 3” I proceed to the empirical analysis of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. By answering the set of six questions introduced by Bacchi (2009), the chapter draws on the problem representation of this policy as well as on its discursive effects. The case of the Norwegian policy on Resolution 1325 is shown as an alternative approach. These analyses are further used to examine the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as discourse. In that part the role of the politics of protection in the US policy on Women, Peace and Security is outlined. Finally, the chapter investigates the transformative potential of this policy and the Norwegian case is involved once again as an alternative gender analysis approach. The third chapter brings me to “Conclusions” in which I discuss in what way the US policy involves the politics of protection and what the new elements are. Furthermore, the objectives of gender equality and stability are confronted. I also touch upon a broad question “Which Women?” that could be a starting point for future research on the same topic.

Resolution 1325

At the end of the twentieth century the inclusion of women into international relations and especially into peace efforts was more and more recognized a must. There was growing pressure from women's civil society organizations on the United Nations Security Council to address gender consideration in a separate resolution (Anderlini 2011). As Susan Willet explains:

A resolution was needed that would include gender mainstreaming in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, because if women were to play an equal part in guaranteeing their security and maintaining peace they needed to be empowered politically, economically and socially, and therefore be represented at all levels of decision-making (2010:148).

This United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (hereinafter: Resolution 1325) was finally adopted in October 2000, nearly a year before the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States. However, “the resolution itself did not emerge in a vacuum” (Anderlini 2011:21). This part shows the context in which Resolution 1325 appeared on the international agenda, the main objectives of the resolution as well as the implementation levels.

Historical Background

A gender perspective in conflict and post-conflict settings was not regarded by governments as highly important until the late 1980s. The roles played by women in the daily survival of their families and communities in the situation of war as well as their contributions to peace efforts were almost completely ignored (Gierycz 2001). The fact that armed conflict affects women and men differently and that women can have different needs in post-conflict reconstruction, was neglected too. Although the issues of women, peace and security have been randomly appearing on the agenda of the United Nations since 1947, unlike other problems such as political underrepresentation or economic challenges faced by women in the situation of peace, the goal of gender equality in the context of conflict and post-conflict was not considered a priority, neither at international nor at national or regional policy-making level (Gierycz 2001:14). Gender equality seemed to be considered a “luxury” that only women in highly-developed countries can afford but not as a priority in the situation of conflict when “cities are burning” (Tryggestad 2009).

The Second UN World Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980, shaped by the climate of the Cold War, raised the problem of the missing gender perspective in peace and security agenda. However, the first UN Conference that included feminist approach to peace and security issues was only the Third UN Conference in Nairobi in 1985 (Gierycz 2001). Some important conclusions were made there also in regard to the definition of peace and security: it was agreed that peace means not only the absence of war but has to be understood in a broader framework including “equality of the sexes, economic equality and the universal enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN report quoted after Gierycz 2011). In order to talk about peace, women have to be able to enjoy the right to participation in a society on equal footing with men and especially in the decision-making processes (Gierycz 2001).

Although the issue of women in the peace and security agenda gained some attention among several governments in the late 1980s, after the Cold War they lost their interest in this problem for nearly another decade³ (Gierycz 2001). The role of women in conflict resolution appeared on the international agenda again in the late 1990s fronted by civil society organizations. However, before that, the Fourth UN World Conference in Beijing in 1995, when urging for gender mainstreaming in all critical areas, included women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict settings. The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (particularly Platform E) emphasized, among others, the need for women’s participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Gierycz 2001). These ideas were further developed in the Beijing Plus Five Declaration from 2000, which, according to Willett (2010), laid the foundations for Resolution 1325.

Although both the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action and the Beijing Plus Five Declaration awoke the hope of change in regard to Women, Peace and Security, many scholars would argue that it was rather the advocacy of civil society organizations in the late 1990s that finally encouraged the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1325 (Cockburn 2007, Tryggstad 2009, Anderlini 2011, Barnes 2011). According to Karen Barnes,

³ The atrocities in Bosnian war (1992-1995) included mass rapes and the abuses of women’s rights gained some attention of the international community at this time. However, rape was not addressed as a hard security issue until the last decade but it was considered opportunistic (www.peacewomen.org).

Resolution 1325 “would not have been adopted without the initial momentum from civil society” (2011:25). Torunn Tryggestad similarly claims that “the international women’s movement played a pivotal role for lobbying for Resolution 1325” (2009:540). Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) had for long advocated the need for addressing women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict settings (Tryggestad 2009). For example, a group of international civil society organizations coordinated by WILPF, the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus, played the leading role in drafting the outcome document of the Commission on the Status of Women in 1998 which addressed the situation of women in conflict and the need for mainstreaming a gender perspective in peace efforts (www.peacewomen.org). Based on the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security was formed to lobby on the UN Security Council for a resolution on Women, Peace and Security and this group continues nowadays as a watchdog of the steps undertaken by the United Nations to operationalize women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict settings (Tryggestad 2009). Another campaign that played the critical role was “Women Building Peace: From the Village Council to the Negotiating Table” initiated in 1999 by a British non-governmental organization, International Alert (Anderlini 2011). This campaign, targeting first and foremost the European Parliament, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Security Council, urged for both the protection of women in the context of conflict, and their participation in peace processes at the decision-making level (Anderlini 2011). After this campaign the process of including a gender perspective into peace efforts considerably accelerated. In March 2000 Bangladesh introduced to the UN Security Council the themes that were undertaken by Resolution 1325 which was finally adopted in October the same year. Following this step, both the European Parliament and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development adopted their own bills on Women, Peace and Security (Anderlini 2011). Recently, with almost a decade of delay, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization also adopted its own act on Resolution 1325 (www.peacewomen.org).

Objectives of Resolution 1325: Four Pillars

The adoption of Resolution 1325 was seen, on the one hand, as a victory in the struggles to emphasize the importance of including a gender perspective into peace and security, and on the other hand, as only a first step on the way to achieving gender equality in conflict and

post-conflict settings (Barnes 2011, Willett 2010). This resolution is considered remarkable in many respects. Unlike previous documents concerning Women, Peace and Security, Resolution 1325 does not exclusively concentrate on women as victims in need of protection (Anderlini 2011, Barnes 2011, Willett 2010), but as Sanam Anderlini puts it:

It was not just about recognizing women's victimization and need for fair treatment, it was a demand for establishing women as equal voices in making decisions pertaining to peace, security, and ultimately power (2011:20-21).

The protection of women and girls against sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings is only one of four pillars of Resolution 1325. The other three pillars are conflict prevention, participation and representation, and finally peacebuilding and reconstruction processes (Anderlini 2011). The prevention pillar focuses on women's important role in early warning mechanisms that aim to counter wars and military interventions at the very first phase. The participation pillar stresses the necessity to include more female agents in all peace efforts, including decision-making processes at the negotiating table. Finally, the peacebuilding pillar urges for the recognition of women's distinct needs in reconstruction processes as well as their role in building post-conflict societies (Anderlini 2011). Since the participation and the protection pillars come across prevention and peacebuilding, the thesis will mainly touch upon the tension between women's participation and protection in conflict and post-conflict settings.

The goals of Resolution 1325 were developed by four later resolutions on women, peace and security⁴. Resolution 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010) primarily address sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings, and, starting with Resolution 1820 they all recognize the use of rape as a systematic weapon of war and a crime against humanity. Resolution 1889 (2009) elaborates on the ideas of women's participation in decision-making processes particularly in post-conflict settings. All the five resolutions form the so-called Women, Peace and Security agenda (www.peacewomen.org).

To sum up, although Resolution 1325 recognizes the gender specific impact of wars on women, it goes far beyond that. It is, first and foremost, a resolution aiming to empower

⁴ We are currently expecting a new resolution on sexual violence in conflict to be adopted by the UN Security Council in June 2013 (www.peacewomen.org).

women, where “empowering women” means increasing their participation and representation in conflict prevention and in all peace efforts as well as recognizing their vital role in post-conflict peacebuilding. Therefore, according to Tryggestad, the “acknowledgement of women’s agency in relation to peace and security matters rather than viewing women solely as victims in need of protection is perhaps one of the most important attributes of the resolution” (2009:540).

Levels of Implementation

Although primarily Resolution 1325 was supposed to operate within the UN system it is at the same time “envisaged as a driver of change at the national and regional levels, where the strategies contained within the Resolution can be translated into any given domestic context” (Barnes and Olonisakin 2011:7). Thus, Resolution 1325 works at three different levels that may be partially overlapping: international (international policy organizations such as the UN, the EU, NATO, the AU etc.), regional (conflict zones) and national (the UN Member States). However, Resolution 1325 is not legally binding. The call upon the UN Member States to adopt national policy documents is for this reason crucial to ensure the inclusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the conflict zones (www.peacewomen.org). The implementation of Resolution 1325 varies significantly across countries where competing understandings of Resolution 1325 are being incorporated into national policy documents. Whereas there are some studies on the implementation of Resolution 1325 within the UN system (Shepherd 2008, Mobekk 2010, Puechguirbal 2010, Pratt 2013) as well as in conflict zones (for example Nakaya on Timor Leste, Eltahir-Eltom on Sudan, Richardson Olney on Rwanda, Ikpe on Nigeria, Abdela on Nepal, Njoki Amai on Liberia; all in Barnes 2011), the incorporation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda into national policy documents (and in particular of the countries representing the Global North) seems to be unexplored (Swaine 2013).

Previous Literature and Research Strategy

Searching for relevant secondary literature involved getting an overview of the University of California, Berkeley library books and e-books collection on Resolution 1325 and on gender and war more generally. In October 2012 I had a meeting with the Gender Studies librarian who helped me navigate at the library as well as in the UN database. Furthermore, I was

regularly using scholar.google.com which is an online search engine with academic material. Since most of the material on Resolution 1325 is relatively new, academic journals were a great source of latest articles and commentaries, as well.

As of April 2013 I am not aware of any study on the US policy on the Women, Peace and Security agenda that uses critical textual analysis based on poststructural theory. Furthermore, I am not informed about any academic research on *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* introduced in December 2011, or later policy documents on Resolution 1325 and its subsequent resolution. There is, however, a number of studies on Resolution 1325 and its implementation within the United Nations system or in conflict zones.

This thesis departs from the general research on the Women, Peace and Security agenda and in particular from the works on discourses on Resolution 1325 within the UN system (for example: Shepherd 2008, Simić 2010, Mobekk 2010, Puechguirbal 2010, Pratt 2013). My research particularly takes advantage of three different studies on Resolution 1325. Whereas the works of Laura Shepherd (2008) and Nadine Puechguirbal (2010) offer a comprehensive analysis of the gendered discourses involved in Resolution 1325 and its subsequent resolutions, the very recent article of Nicola Pratt (2013)⁵ examines the racialized relationship of protection and the influence of prioritizing the objective of gender inclusion on reinscribing racial and sexual boundaries. Departing from this research the thesis discusses the US policy on Resolution 1325 and the gendered discourses that are invoked within this policy.

Whereas there are some studies on the implementation of Resolution 1325 within the UN system as well as in conflict zones (mentioned above), the incorporation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda into national policy documents seems to be unexplored (Swaine 2013). Furthermore, this limited research on national policy documents on the Women, Peace and Security agenda focuses almost exclusively on implementation difficulties, particularly on the challenges in translating the policy on Resolution 1325 into practice in conflict zones (Barnes 2011). These studies, however, do not interrogate what the policy documents effectively

⁵ The article of Pratt (2013) was published shortly before the submission of the thesis and therefore I did not really manage to employ her findings in my research, as I wished.

advocate and what the problem is represented to be. What is more, the national action plans of Western countries remain almost completely unexplored although they seem to have influence on conflict zones. This thesis aims to start the process of filling up these gaps and to contribute to the production of knowledge(s) on Women, Peace and Security.

Primary Archive

My research strategy focused on collecting the US policy documents addressing the Women, Peace and Security agenda at the national level. The US policy on Resolution 1325 includes a number of political documents starting with two congressional hearings that were not policy documents yet but gave background to them: *U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325: Recognizing Women's Vital Roles in Achieving Peace and Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session* (Congress, May 15, 2008) and *U.N. Resolution 1325: More Action Needed: A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session* (Congress, October 26, 2010). In 2011 the US Government introduced the central strategy document: *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security* (The Obama Administration, December 2011). The launch was instituted by *Executive Order 13595 – Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security* (The Obama Administration, December 19, 2011). As an implementation of the national action plan, the Department of State as well as the US Agency for International Development introduced their strategy plans: *United States Department of State Implementation Plan of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security* (Department of State, August 2012) and *United States Agency for International Development Implementation of the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security* (USAID, August 2012). At the same time the Congress adopted *Women, Peace and Security Act of 2012, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session* (Congress, August 1, 2012). Finally, since the thesis involves a juxtaposition of the problem representations on the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the United States and in Norway, the interrogation included becoming familiar with two Norwegian policy documents on Resolution 1325: *The Norwegian Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council*

Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2006) and especially *Women, Peace and Security: Norway's Strategic Plan 2011-13* (2011).

Approaching my research question involved becoming familiar with all these documents. However, the thesis gives textual priority to *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* (hereinafter: the US NAP or the NAP for short) which is the core policy document on Resolution 1325 in the United States and the document that the US Government drafted in response to the call of the UN on the Member States to develop national policy documents (www.peacewomen.org). All other mentioned US policy documents are based on the terminology included in the US NAP.

To identify relevant policy documents on Resolution 1325 I used a number of sources. Through ProQuest Congressional, an Internet database of documents issued by the US Congress, I got access to the Congressional hearings on Resolution 1325. PeaceWomen, an online portal of information on Women, Peace and Security, provided me with the national action plans on Women, Peace and Security (both in the United States and in Norway and in case of the latter: both the first and the revised one). To find the rest of the documents I used the official web portal of the US Government: www.usa.gov.

Presentations of Findings

The research processes included the presentations of my findings at two conferences. At the Gender and Power in Global Institutions Symposium at the University of California, Berkeley I delivered the presentation “The US Policy on Women, Peace and Security: What’s the Problem Represented to Be?” at the panel *Gendering the Global Interventions: the Logic of Protection* (November 27th, 2012). At the Thinking Gender 2013 Conference at the University of Los Angeles, California I presented the paper “The US Policy on Women, Peace and Security: Feminist Empowerment or Masculinist Protection?” at the panel *Redressing Patriarchal Pain* (February 1st, 2013). Finally I will be presenting the paper “The Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the United States and in Norway: A Cross-Cultural Comparison of National Policy Advocacy” shortly after the submission of the thesis at the 6th Annual Workshop for Women in International Security: Women, Violence and International Security at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto (June 1st, 2013).

Fieldwork

Working on the thesis involved a fieldwork conducted in the United States between August 2012 and May 2013. I spent the fall semester 2012 at the University of California, Berkeley developing theoretical foundations for my research. In the spring semester 2013 I undertook a research internship at Women's International League for Peace and Freed at their UN Office in New York where I had a chance to get closer to the structures of the United Nations.

Between August and December 2012 I had the privilege of participating in an exchange program at the University of California, Berkeley. Thanks to the efforts of Professor Barrie Thorne I was connected to the intellectual community of the Department of Gender and Women's Studies and provided with a setting in which I could pursue my research. The department's curriculum emphasizes transnational gender and as a visiting student researcher I was able to attend two courses that definitely contributed to the development of my thesis. While *Gender, Power and Globalization* encouraged me to critically rethink the politics of globalization, and in particular the discourses on war, masculinity and women's liberation in the context of post-9/11, *Transnational Feminisms* provided me with a critical assessment of the First World Feminism and gave me an overview of women's practices of resistance, both within and beyond the United States.

In the spring semester I enjoyed the opportunity to work on the PeaceWomen Project in New York. My responsibilities included, first and foremost, monitoring the UN system, and in particular keeping track of the developments within the UN Security Council in regard to the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Between January and May 2013 I was attending open debates of the Security Council and analyzing the use of language on gender and women. Furthermore, I was investigating all the new resolutions adopted by the Security Council at the time looking for references to the resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. This research internship provided me with necessary tools for textual analysis of policy documents referring to the UN resolutions that also include national policy documents such as the US NAP.

The main objective of this fieldwork was to become familiar with American culture and values. The observation of the society that strongly reacted to the terrorist attack of 9/11 as well as invaluable discussions with my professors, colleagues and fellow students provided

me with the background information necessarily to undertake my research – I entered the field believing that understanding the specific values of a particular country is necessarily to research policies. Overall, I believe my fieldwork in the United States, both at the University of California, Berkeley and at WILPF UN Office in New York enabled me to gain a better conceptualization of how American society functions in the context of post-9/11 and an overview of attitudes towards war and militarism on the one hand, and towards women on the other.

Chapter 1: THEORY

Unlike children and the frail and elderly, women aren't naturally in need of protection. But like subjugated groups throughout history, women have been overpowered. Women need protection from the unnatural order imposed on our universe – the man-made laws, customs, practices and indulgences that rule modern 'civilization.' They have the aptitude, but are denied the wherewithal to devise and construct their own protections.

(Paula Donovan in Puechguirbal 2010: 176)

This chapter places the US policy on Women, Peace and Security into the landscape of international relations. The first part is a search for women and men within the studies of war. Resolution 1325 as a sort of answer to the claim "Where are the Women?" is problematized as an advocacy tool that national action plans (NAPs), including the US NAP, build on. NAPs are later discussed as both creating opportunities and risks for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The chapter further reflects upon the protection pillar of Resolution 1325 and discusses women's protection as a precarious tool for women's liberation and gender equality as an objective: the focus is on the politics of protection and the logic of masculinist protection in particular. The conceptualization of security is explored as the driving force for the politics of protection. The chapter, finally, presents an overview of the political situation in the United States after the terrorist attack of September 11.

Where are Women, Where are Men?

In the conversation that Cynthia Enloe and Carol Cohn had shortly after September 2001, the authors show how asking feminist questions can help understand international politics (Cohn 2003)⁶. According to Enloe and Cohn (2003), feminist questions are critical tools and using them helps make sense of events in the international relations. Whenever conducting a political analysis of any kind, feminist researchers should principally ask the question "Where are the women?" (Cohn 2003).

⁶ The whole text is a conversation between Carol Cohn and Cynthia Enloe. Whenever I refer to the content of the text more generally I use "Cohn 2003" as a reference since she leads the conversation. However I do use "Enloe in Cohn 2003" to highlight particular arguments made by Enloe.

“Where are the women?” is the inquiry Enloe (1989) and many other feminist scholars (Blanchard 2003, Willet 2010, Wibben 2011) have been repeatedly raising over the last decades. Women remain invisible in the field of international relations. Due to the lack of women’s influence on international politics and security studies, these areas continue to be dominated by men and ultimately highly masculinized (Cohn 2003).

Interestingly enough, whereas women are traditionally neglected in international relations, men and the practices of war are perceived gender neutral (Hearn 2002). However, according to Jeff Hearn, “men and militarism are so obviously coupled that it is hard to know where to start [when analyzing it]” (2012:36). He further claims that it is men who “remain the specialists in violence, armed conflict and killing, whether by organized militaries, terrorism or indeed domestic violence” (2012:37). Men dominate these actions. Despite the fact that they can suffer from war and armed conflict as women do, men bear the major responsibility for killings and military spending in conflict settings and otherwise (Hearn 2012).

According to Cynthia Cockburn (2012), the sexual division of work in war may resemble the sexual division of labor more generally. This division is strictly associated with the constructions of women and men involving essentializing tendencies (Kronsell and Svedberg 2012). These tendencies make women/femininity “naturally” peaceful, cooperative and caring. Men/masculinity, on the other hand, “naturally” are to be aggressive and violent. Women are characterized by empathy, men by authority. While women are perceived as the victims of violence, men are regarded the perpetrators. Women are said to be vulnerable, weak and passive mothers and caregivers, men are supposed to undertake the role of proactive protectors, warriors and policymakers, and so forth (Kronsell and Svedberg 2012, Cockburn 2012). Although women as the perpetrators of violence as well as men as the victims of rape can appear in conflict and post-conflict settings, this does not undermine the general associations described above. However, similarly to Cockburn I will claim that “observing the sexual division of war and especially observing its vagaries, it becomes clear that the case for gender as a power relation implicated in the perpetuation of war cannot rest on what individual men and women do” (2012:25).

Gender and Patriarchy

According to Annica Kronsell and Erika Svedberg, gender, understood as “perhaps the most central social institution in the life of humans”, is being continuously made and remade at both individual and organizational level, in the context of peace as well as of war (2012:1). Making gender involves “subjectivities like men and women, masculinities and femininities as well as gender power relations, norms and principles” (Kronsell and Svedberg 2012:2). Making gender is always a part of patriarchy (Kronsell and Svedberg 2012).

“Gender” and “patriarchy” are both convenient terms for the analyses of international relations and war, argues Cohn (2003). However, political actors are not equally eager to use both of them. The relatively popular use of “gender” on the political arena is often dictated by “political correctness”⁷ only and therefore, this concept is commonly mentioned without understanding of the power relations that it evokes (Cohn 2003). In this “politically correct” usage “gender” most of the times simply signifies and is used interchangeably with “women” (Willett 2011). “Patriarchy”, on the contrary, hardly ever appears in political documents. Unlike neutral-sounding “gender”, “patriarchy” seems to be *scary* and is a commonly avoided term (Cohn 2003). This is one of the reasons for Enloe to encourage taking advantage of this term: “patriarchy” reminds of unequal gender power relations. In contrast to “gender”, “patriarchy” is a term that can make one feel uncomfortable. However, according to Enloe, understanding patriarchy is critical to revealing how male domination takes place. As she explains:

It is not men-on-top that makes something patriarchal. It's men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more “serious,” and “the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine” that makes any organization, any community, any society patriarchal. It's never automatic; it's rarely self-perpetuating. It takes daily tending. It takes decisions—even if those are masked as “tradition.” It relies on many women finding patriarchal relationships comfortable, sometimes rewarding (Enloe in Cohn 2003:1192).

This citation shows how the ideas of patriarchy and a particular notion of masculinity operate in power processes, and how women may effectively support male domination. As Enloe

⁷ I recall the term “political correctness” after Cohn (2003).

depicted above, patriarchal relations do not exclusively rely on the men in charge but they strongly depend on the continuously conforming the ideal of masculinity on the ground and many women's support to it.

Masculinity, Femininity and War

Although Hearn (2012) claimed that men are dominantly accountable for violence in conflict and post-conflict settings (and otherwise), R. Connell (1987), similarly to Enloe (Enloe in Cohn 2003), argues that the focus should not be on men but rather on a particular type of masculinity. This notion called “hegemonic masculinity”⁸ (Connell 1987) (but also referred to as “dominant masculinity” (Simić 2010), “patriarchal masculinity” (Cockburn 2012) and so forth) can be understood as “an ideal type of masculinity, that varies across time and culture, but which serves to support male power and female subordination” (Willett 2010:145). As Olivera Simić argues, this type of masculinity “cannot succeed without reducing women to feminine roles that are ascribed inferior status and power” (2010:189). Consequently, “the feminine is marginalized ideologically and institutionally” (Simić 2010:189). Militarism relies on this form of masculinity which basically means that hegemonic masculinity further builds on the limited understanding of women's agency in conflict settings and seeks fulfillment in militarization: “it is a masculinity (and a complementary femininity) that not only serves militarism very well indeed, but *seeks and needs militarization and war for its fulfillment*” (Cockburn 2012:32, emphasis original). Here both Cockburn (2012) and Enloe (Enloe in Cohn 2003) seem to suggest that this process is strategic. When applying the notion of hegemonic masculinity to my research question I am, however, going to take the stand that the process connecting men/masculinity and militarism does not have to be deliberate but may actually be, contrary to what Enloe and partially Cockburn claimed above, self-perpetuating.

Anyhow, interrogating the concepts of masculinity is not yet enough. Rather, understanding international relations must include the investigation of how masculinity and femininity operate in relation to each other (Cohn 2003). Similarly to Cohn and Enloe (2003) I will argue that the notions of masculinity and femininity play a critical role in the studies of international

⁸ Connell and Messerschmidt problematize the notion of “hegemonic masculinity” in a later article ““Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept” (2005).

relations and war: international politics produce and reproduce gender relations on the one hand, and the concepts of masculinity and femininity underpin international relations on the other. Although different notions of masculinity and femininity are constituted simultaneously in international politics and coexist in political discourses, the power dynamics in which some of these notions become dominant in the discourses on Resolution 1325 will be given particular attention. The thesis will, therefore, concentrate on the notions of femininity and masculinity that gained textual priority in the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. I, however, will ignore whether the processes in which some notions become dominant over others, are strategically or deliberately framed.

Resolution 1325 as an Advocacy Tool

Resolution 1325 may be considered a sort of response to the claim “Where are the women?”. Despite the fact that the adoption of Resolution 1325 was the critical step on the way to ensure gender sensitivity in conflict and post-conflict settings, the resolution has been commonly criticized for ambiguous language and missing several provisions (Tryggestad 2010, Barnes 2011). Researchers agree that Resolution 1325, as well as its subsequent resolutions, fails to provide effective implementation tools (Tryggestad 2010, Barnes 2011). It does not include sufficient provisions in terms of monitoring and enforcement and it further fails to articulate sanctions and accountability mechanisms (Tryggestad 2010, Barnes 2011). What is more, Resolution 1325 may still remain unknown among the grassroots level women in conflict zones (Anderlini 2011). Finally, and perhaps most importantly from the point of view of my research question, not one of the five resolutions on Women, Peace and Security addresses the link between masculinity, militarism and patriarchy (Barnes 2011).

Almost 13 years after the adoption, Resolution 1325 is the most frequently quoted document on women in conflict and post-conflict settings (Barnes 2011). According to many scholars, the undeniable achievement of Resolution 1325 is that it provides a useful policy framework (Barnes and Olonisakin 2011, Tryggestad 2010). Karen Barnes and Funmi Olonisakin argue, however, that over the last decade “advocacy overweighs substance” meaning little is known about the impact of Resolution 1325 on women in conflict zones (2011:3). Although to some extent I would agree with the authors in that “talking” seems to overshadow “acting”, at the same time I believe that not enough attention was paid to what is effectively advocated: if

Resolution 1325 provides a useful framework, how does it frame the problem? What is the problem represented to be? What does it imply and which assumptions have underpinned it? These questions need to be addressed in order to speculate on a long-term impact that such policy can have on gender equality and the position of women.

Critical Assessments

At the time of introduction of Resolution 1325 in October 2000 most researchers and activists were enthusiastic: it was the first document of this kind introduced by the UN Security Council (Tryggestad 2009, Barnes 2011). It was a “path-breaking” event in international politics (Pratt 2013). Political actors finally recognized women’s issues as of high importance for the UN Security Council. Over a decade later Resolution 1325 still remains the most influential document on women in conflict and post-conflict settings. To give an example of the actions that were undertaken after the adoption of Resolution 1325: the resolution was translated into more than a hundred languages, it encouraged more than forty of the UN Member States to develop their national action plans and it results in two annual debates dedicated exclusively to the Women, Peace and Security agenda at the UN Security Council (www.peacewomen.org). Years have passed and assessments are currently more divided: not only in regard to the influence of the resolution and its implementation on the ground but also to the formulation of the document. Researchers differ in the assessment of what the reason is for the slow implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda or its lack of improvement of gender equality issues in the context of war (for example Tryggestad 2009 versus Shepherd 2008 discussed below). Here, I take a look at two different studies on Resolution 1325: an optimistic and a pessimistic one.

Optimistic Assessment

Torunn Tryggestad (2009) can be called “an optimist” when it comes to the assessment of Resolution 1325. Although she recognizes some constraints of the resolution, such as the lack of accountability mechanisms and challenging in practice recruitment processes, she argues that Resolution 1325 “has nevertheless made a difference” (Tryggestad 2009:539). According to her, the adoption of Resolution 1325 by the UN Security Council can be regarded as “the expression of a new norm in the making” in international relations and in the UN system

particularly (Tryggestad 2009:539). She considers this change in norm making as the first step on the way to a meaningful change.

Tryggestad claims that Resolution 1325 “has indeed made a difference in putting women’s interests and concerns on the UN security agenda” (2009:541). Observing the development of the UN system in regard to increasing references to Women, Peace and Security in the UN documents (such as the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit), as well as adopting the subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and changing in attitudes among the UN staff, she notices a few main achievements (Tryggestad 2009). Firstly, Resolution 1325 placed the issues of Women, Peace and Security on the table of the UN Security Council and since 2000 the United Nations is obligated to stimulate and monitor the developments in women’s inclusion in peace processes. Secondly, the resolution does not portrait women in the context of armed conflict as passive victims in need of protection, but recognizes their contribution to peace efforts as well. That is, it is not only women whose needs have to be addressed and whose rights must be respected in international security but it is also international security that must rely on women’s agency for sustainable peace to be accomplished: the participation and the protection of women was recognized as a global security issue. Therefore, thirdly, one of the most important achievements of Resolution 1325, according to Tryggestad (2009), is that it creates a bridge between “soft” and “hard” politics at the UN Security Council. As she argues, the resolution acknowledges “a link between the promotion of women’s rights and international peace and security – between traditionally soft sociopolitical issues and hard security” (Tryggestad 2009:541). As she finally claims, “a formal barrier was broken” (Tryggestad 2009:541).

Many scholars show their disillusionment and impatience towards the impact of Resolution 1325 (see for example Shepherd 2008 discussed below). Tryggestad, however, claims that the problem is not the lack of political will, but it rather is the matter of time:

The slow pace of implementation of Resolution 1325 does not necessarily have to do with discriminatory practices against women as is often claimed. At least, that is not the only explanation. It generally takes a long time to change anything at the UN. Also, progress on issues such as women, peace and security often falls victim to larger controversies of power politics (2009:549).

According to Tryggestad (2009), it has been challenging to mainstream a gender perspective over a short period of time as well as to ensure that women’s rights are prioritized when

“cities are burning”. Moreover, the North-South division, as Tryggestad put it, strengthened significantly by the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the war on terror, is not conducive to the implementation of Resolution 1325. So although the pace of change has been relatively slow, Tryggestad continues to believe that this is not the result of discriminatory practices against women but rather of the structures of the UN as an institution (and particularly “UN’s ponderous organizational culture and traditional ways of thinking and acting” (2009:550)) and unfavorable political climate after September 2001.

In a later interview with Tryggestad for *Kilden*, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Resolution 1325, she admits that over the last decade too much attention was paid to the protection of women from sexual and gender-based violence at the cost of interest in women’s participation (Førde 2010). She, however, does not relate it to the framework of Resolution 1325. Rather, Tryggestad claims that this course of policies on Women, Peace and Security was dictated by “real needs” of local women and the plague of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings (Førde 2010).

Whereas it is difficult to disagree with Tryggestad that Resolution 1325 put for the first time the issue of Women, Peace and Security on the agenda of the UN Security Council and this definitely is a critical step, it is rather doubtful whether the resolution managed to build a bridge between “soft” and “hard” politics at the UN Security Council. As the study of Shepherd (2008) will show, the resolution made women a matter of “hard” security politics of the UN, it did not, however, break the perception of women as vulnerable, needy and essentially peaceful. What is even more important with regard to the research question of the thesis, although women are represented in Resolution 1325 as the actors of change, the implementation has been organized around protection rather than participation of women (Shepherd 2008).

Pessimistic Assessment

Laura Shepherd (2008) seems to be rather “a pessimist” in her assessment of Resolution 1325 and subsequent documents. In the book *Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as Practice* (2008) she offers a political critique and frame analysis of Resolution 1325. Her research is built around two concepts: gender violence and international security, and both are understood broadly. Shepherd’s main research question is: “How are the concepts of

(international) security and (gender) violence discursively constituted, and with what effects?” (2008:6).

Shepherd’s (2008) analysis departs from the interrogation of the documents which are recalled by Resolution 1325. As she notices, the resolutions and reports mentioned in Resolution 1325 mainly refer to protection of children and other vulnerable groups in conflict and post-conflict context. Thus, Shepherd (2008) argues that such background places women in the position of the need for protection already at the very beginning. However, the representation of women as the victims of violence in need of protection is not the only one included in Resolution 1325. The constructions of women are as follows: “women in need of protection (submission); women as informal political organizers (participation); and women as formal political actors (representation)” (Shepherd 2008:116). Shepherd (2008) problematizes all these constructions and shows that each of them may in a long-term reinforce gender inequalities and contribute to gender violence: all these constructions “rely on the recognition of women as nurturers (read: mothers) and supporters of peace, inherently pacifist” (2008:118). Ultimately, these representations close off other opportunities for women.

According to Shepherd (2008), women in Resolution 1325 are generally represented as a homogenous group having common interests. These interests are “essentially peaceful and socially beneficial” and this seems to be based on the binary opposition of feminized peacemaker and masculinized soldier (Shepherd 2008:89). As Shepherd claims “the space for transgression or reversal – that is, for women to be actors in armed conflict or *victims of peace-building or post-conflict resolution* – is limited” (2008:162, emphasis added). Furthermore, the interests of women are depicted as unchangeable and fixed once forever and once for all.

Shepherd argues that in Resolution 1325 “textual priority is given to the predication of ‘women’ as always different from, and positioned as inferior to, ‘men’” (2008:89). Furthermore, Resolution 1325 does not make a differentiation between sex and gender. Neither there is any distinction between gender and women but rather the concept of women seems to be based on the biological (and total) difference from men and the term gender (used interchangeably with “women”) operates in Resolution 1325 as synonymous to

“womenandchildren” (Enloe 1993, Shepherd 2008). Women are portrayed as providers, caregivers and mothers and their role is to preserve social order. Men, on the other hand, are the great “absent” in Resolution 1325: the word “men” is not mentioned in the resolution a single time and despite the references to gender (which are, as noticed before, understood as “womenandchildren”) men are not recorded in the document. Referring to Connell, Shepherd claims that “men are implicitly present as the power holders” (Connell in Shepherd 2008:117).

To sum up, although Shepherd recognizes the multiple representations of women in Resolution 1325, she argues that all of them involve essentializing tendencies and generalizations about women, and therefore, they may be complicit in gender violence. These representations ultimately preserve rather than challenge the social order based on male domination and leave women at the position of men’s inferior. Following the analysis of Shepherd, there are three main actors in Resolution 1325: the state, women and invisible men. The questions about power relations between the parties would be as follows: Who is effectively protected by Resolution 1325? And who, in consequence, is empowered? The inquiry the thesis will raise would therefore be: Will women ultimately benefit from national policy documents on Resolution 1325, introduced by the United States?

National Action Plans

The implementation of Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolution cannot succeed without the involvement of the UN Member States who at the same time have the potential to work against the constraints of the resolution as for example the ones mentioned above both by Tryggestad (2009) and Shepherd (2008). National policy documents on Resolution 1325 may include national action plans, strategic plans, governmental hearings and bills, administrative orders and so forth. This thesis pays particular attention to the *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* (the US NAP/the NAP) and complementary to Norway’s *Strategic Plan 2011-2013: Women, Peace and Security* (the NSP) which is a revised version of Norway’s first NAP (www.peacewomen.org). National action plans (NAPs) can be regarded as “means to address the implementation gap” that refers to the gap between policy claims and the practices on the ground (Swaine 2013:1). According to Aisling Swaine, NAPs, on the one hand, “offer opportunity to advance national implementation”, but on the other,

“present risk” when it comes to translating the resolutions on Women, Peace and Security into national policies (2013:1). In terms of opportunities, NAPs enhance the national focus on the Women, Peace and Security agenda through coordinating related initiatives and strengthening national commitments on gender equality more generally (Swaine 2013). The constraints include, for instance, impoverished interpretation of the resolutions on Women, Peace and Security resulting in the adoption of selective approaches – the issue that the thesis pays particular attention to (Swaine 2013). However, the thesis addresses the US NAP (and complimentary the NSP) as both creating opportunities and risks for the success of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and gender equality in conflict and post-conflict settings.

The Politics of Protection

As previously noted, the four pillars of Resolution 1325 seem to be partially overlapping and both the protection and the participation of women come across conflict prevention and post-conflict relief and recovery. However, over the last decade the protection of women in conflict and post-conflict settings, as only one of four pillars, seems to gain much attention of the United States Government, whereas participation appears to be somehow neglected. Although this is not either participation or protection logic at the very start and participation of women can contribute to their protection and the other way around, the policies on the Women, Peace and Security has been apparently formed in this way in recent years: little attention paid to the participation of women is often explained by the need for protection coming first (Tryggestad 2009). In this part, therefore, I am going to investigate the politics of protection which will be further analyzed in the US policy on Women, Peace and Security.

Ten years after the adoption of Resolution 1325 Susan Willett argued that “[o]ne of the most powerful ideas that mobilizes peacekeeping forces is the notion of the ‘natural’ bond between the protectors and the protected” (2010:147). She further claimed that common among the protectors is the belief that “they can see the ‘Big Picture’, not merely because they are stronger, but because they are smarter” (2010:147). Ultimately, this belief gives the protectors the right to speak on behalf on the protected.

The politics of protection was much earlier addressed on the ground of feminist studies of international relations. Enloe (1989), for instance, showed that protection is a gendered relationship: feminization of the protected ones reinforces masculinization of the protectors

and vice versa. However, this process of feminization does not merely target women but can include, for example, the whole population protected in a peacekeeping mission. The same is true about the simultaneous process of masculinization: not only men undertake the role of peacekeepers but a number of women represent the forces of blue helmets and ultimately of the protectors. Therefore, protection as a relationship concerns women and men but also femininity and masculinity more generally. This will also be the case of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security: although this policy primarily targets women it will also entail feminization of vulnerable populations such as children and the elderly. The masculinization, on the other hand, will circulate from the peacekeepers to the state.

Masculinist Domination and the State

What is typical of the politics of protection is that most attention is paid to the protected ones, whereas the figure of the protector and *his* political goals, deliberate or not, are commonly neglected⁹ (Brown 1995). We do not tend to ask why the protector offers protection but we rather concentrate on those “in need”. Thus, gender power relations involved in the politics of protection are overlooked and men in particular seem to be missing in this picture. In the text “Finding the Man in the State”, Wendy Brown (1995) tracks the development of masculinist domination within the state and the role of the politics of protection. This study helps understand how masculinity can operate within a state without intentionally pursuing all men’s interest.

According to Brown, masculinist domination refers to the supremacy which “expresses itself as the power to describe and run the world and the power of access to women” (1995:167). This domination further “entails both a general claim to territory and claims to, about and against specific “others”” (Brown 1995:167). Thus, masculinist domination is not limited to men’s power over women. The other forms can for example be the supremacy of bourgeois, white, heterosexual, colonial, monotheistic, etc (Brown 1995). What is more, the state can be masculinist without intentionally pursuing all men’s interest (Brown 1995). Brown, however, does not address the differences between these forms of domination – they all seem to

⁹ The exception is the so-called “mafia protection” where the attention is mainly paid to the Mafia as the provider of “protection”(Bueno de Mesquita and Hafer 2007).

represent the same patterns which may not always be accurate. In case of my research question, the textual attitude of American peacekeepers will, for example, differ significantly from the one towards conflict zone men and women. Nevertheless, Brown (1995) pays attention to the circulation of masculinity as a concept between men and the state and, although protection is not her main focus, she includes the politics of protection as a part of masculinist domination.

Masculinist State

Brown (1995) discusses the changing role of the state in the dynamics between women and men¹⁰. As she shows, the state used to function as a public sphere available only to men since only men were considered political subjects until the late nineteenth century. Women, in the light of law, were men's property and did not involve in direct relationships with the state¹¹. This changed in the modern times: women entered the public sphere and at the same time the private sphere became politicized. In order to protect women the state took over the traditionally men's responsibility for regulating kinship: the state was supposed to mediate the relationships between women and men and in consequence help women liberate from the domination of men (Brown 1995). However, the state has not simply liberated women. According to Brown (1995), the problem with the state is that it has always relied on the rule of masculinist domination, whether understood as the power of all men over all women or as other forms of supremacy. So, instead of liberating women, what really changed was rather the power holder: the figure of men (father, husband and brother) was replaced by the state. However, the power dynamics based on masculinist domination persists (Brown 1995).

In modern times the masculinist state became the main provider of security for women, as Brown (1995) claims. However, this protection is not free of charge: "the heavy price of institutionalized protection is always a measure of dependence and agreement to abide by the protector's rules" (Brown 1995:167). The state offers protection but in return requires accepting its rule: when receiving the institutionalized protection (against men), women are

¹⁰ This is a general discussion but the examples from the modern times recalled by Brown concern mainly the United States.

¹¹ This claim may be somehow inaccurate because some women get into direct relationship with the state even before winning the right to vote. Witch trials in the Medieval period can be an example.

supposed to agree on the regulations imposed by the (masculinist) state. According to Brown, “such appeals involve seeking protection *from* masculinist institutions *against* men” (1995:170, emphasis original). In other words, women are protected by masculinist institutions from men under the institutionalized rules of the former¹². Nonetheless, the violence performed by the latter remains legitimated. As Brown argues, “to be “protected” by the same power whose violation one fears perpetuates the very modality of dependence and powerlessness marking much of women's experience across widely diverse cultures and epochs” (1995:170). As a result, the relationship between the state and women produces them not as active political subjects but rather as disciplined states subjects. The protective practices of the state effectively constitute regulated and subordinated subjectivities (Brown 1995).

The representation of state as “the coldest of all cold monsters” (Nietzsche in Brown 1995:166) was criticized by Helga Hernes (1987) who showed that state could well function as “a friend” of women. To describe Scandinavian countries Hernes (1987) coined the expressions “a woman-friendly state” and “state feminism”. These two concepts intertwine. According to Hernes, state feminism refers to “‘feminism from above’ in the form of gender equality and social policies and the feminisation of welfare state relevant professions” combined with “‘feminisation from below’ through the mobilisation of women in political and cultural activities” (Hernes in Borchorst and Siim 2008:210). Here, instead of protection, the relationship between the state and women seems to be based on cooperation and women’s active participation and mobilization. A woman-friendly state, understood as a “state [that] would not force harder choices on women than on men, or permit unjust treatment on the basis of sex” (Hernes 1987:15), appears to be the consequence of state feminism and the institutionalisation of gender equality. Ultimately, a woman-friendly state produces women as active political subjects – in contrast to the masculinist state as described by Brown (1995). Finally, Hernes stresses that in a woman-friendly state, “injustice on the basis of gender would be largely eliminated without an increase in other forms of inequality, such as among group of women” (Hernes in Borchorst and Siim 2008:210).

¹² However, women can be a part of masculinized organizations as well what is not problematized by Brown (1995).

Both concepts, a woman-friendly state and state feminism, have faced increasing criticism in recent years for homogenizing the interests of all women and particularly ignoring the interests of ethnic minority and immigrant women (Lister 2006, Borchost and Siim 2008, Siim and Skjeje 2008). Taking into consideration the fact that Brown (1995) defines masculinist domination broadly and not only as the supremacy of men over women, the account of Hernes (1987) may not necessarily underpin Brown's argument. The state seems to have potential to function as both: "the coldest of all cold monster" and a "woman-friendly state. The critical question would, therefore, be "for which women?". The different roles that the state can play will become more visible in "Chapter 3" of the thesis which involves a cross-cultural comparison of the policies on Resolution 1325 in the US that is regarded as a masculinist state (Brown 1995) or security state (Young 2003, see below) and in Norway that is a part of "woman-friendly" Scandinavia (Hernes 1987).

Masculinist Protection and the State

The text of Brown (1995) was written a few years before the terrorist attack of 9/11. Another development of the state's domination has been taking place since then. Specifically, since September 2001 the politics of protection became much broader and more complicated. The politics of protection in the context of September 2001 is developed by Iris Marion Young (2003). Young (2003) analyzes the security events after the terrorist attack of 9/11. Similarly to Cohn (2003), she argues that using gender lens to research these events provides a useful interpretation of international relations and the changes that came as the aftermath of 9/11 in particular. However, in contrast to for example Cockburn (2012), Young (2003) emphasizes that she uses the term gender as part of her interpretation, not explanation. Gender in this understanding is used as a tool of critique and it will be similarly applied to my research.

The Logic of Masculinist Protection

Many scholars interested in peace and conflict studies and in gender studies investigate the relationship between men and war as well as masculinity and militarism (Enloe 1989, Mobekk 2010, Puechguirbal 2010, Simić 2010, Hearn 2012, Cockburn 2012, Byrne & McCulloch 2012, see the introductory part of this chapter). Most of such analyses are based on generalizations about men and women and the relationship between them: these studies commonly refer to the different attributes of men and women and while men are often

considered violent, women generally are perceived peaceful. In this view, the structures of violence are explained by the masculine attribute: bellicosity. This is, Young (2003) argues, a static explanation that ignores the understanding of gender as a process.

According to Young (2003), several types of masculinity can provide the interpretation of war events. The logic referring to the male domination model where the notion of masculinity is basically understood as violence was examined by many researchers¹³ (Connell 1987, Enloe 1989, Simić 2010, Hearn 2012). The concept of masculinist protection which involves the notion of masculinity conformed by the provision of security for women and children, seems, on the contrary, to be unexplored. Although this logic turns out to be very powerful in legitimizing actions, the concept of masculinist protection has not received enough attention among feminist scholars (Young 2003). Nor has the protection pillar of Resolution 1325 been widely analyzed in the light of the logic of masculinist protection¹⁴.

The logic of masculinist protection does not simply replace the male domination model. Rather, these two notions of masculinity are interrelated and operate together. In the latter “masculine men wish to master women sexually for the sake of their own gratification and to have the pleasures of domination” (Young 2003:4). Harassing women is in this model a manifestation of power and domination. In this interpretation the man is selfish, aggressive and violent (Young 2003). He seeks to enslave women for his sexual satisfaction. This view corresponds closely with the traditional organization of masculinist institutions such as the military. The logic of masculinity protection is, on the contrary, connected with chivalry (Young 2003). The chivalrous man is neither aggressive nor selfish. In relation to women he is loving and self-sacrificing. He is brave, virtuous and responsible, always ready to protect women and children. Thus, these two logics of masculinity are strongly interconnected: “[t]he dominative masculinity [...] constitutes protective masculinity as its other” (Young 2003:4). The “good” man may only appear in relation to the “bad” one – and vice versa; one does not exist without the other. Finally, this dynamic can similarly constitute a “good” and a “bad” woman. The “good” woman is obedient and docile, grateful for the provision of security and

¹³ As already pointed out, these authors may differ in how they call this dominant type of masculinity. However, they all seem to refer to masculinity that is based on violence as a tool to overpower women and the feminine.

¹⁴ The exception may be the text of Pratt (2013).

in exchange ready to obey the rules imposed by the protector. The “bad” one does not feel so happy in this situation and refuses to receive the protection (Young 2003).

As Young (2003) shows, the logic of masculinist protection is closely associated with the position of man as a householder who protects his family. This concept is further connected with male leaders and statesmen who provide protection to their folk. It may be understood as the pastoral power as well. In all of the mentioned cases these relationships are based on unequal power dynamics and domination (Young 2003). The core issue is, therefore, the subordinate relationship of the protected ones. This is a patriarchal logic that puts women in a position of dependence and obedience. Female submission originates here from the position of being protected. However, this is not subordination under a violent male aggressor but rather a submission to a loving and responsible protector. The male’s “patriarchal right emerges from male specialization in security” (Young 2003:6). It therefore legitimates power relations between the protector and the protected one. Although this power relationship may seem to be benevolent and gentle, it is nevertheless built on domination and subordination (Young 2003).

The question that may appear as a comment to the accounts of Brow and Young is whether protection can ever be regarded as a “good thing”. It does not seem to be possible according to the authors: as they claim, protection always involves power relations based on domination. This seems to be in contrast with the common perception in which the provision of security is often considered a necessary “good thing” – which, in consequence, makes it “stripped of its political underpinnings” (Hudson 2012:447). I would argue that protection may, at times, be considered a “good thing” – whenever it recognizes both the protected and the protector as equals. However, since the protected and the protector enter the relationship from different positions of power, the equalization may be very hard to achieve. The active participation of the ones to be protected in creating protection for themselves may be a tool to accomplish it.

Security State

The logic of masculinist protection expands from the traditional relationship between men and women and children in household to the relationship between the state and its citizens (Young 2003). Young argues that “an exposition of the gendered logic of the masculine role of protector in relation to women and children illuminates the meaning and effective appeal of

a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home” (2003:2). At the same time, femininity and masculinity may be ultimately detached from women and men.

The security state acts as the protector of citizens but protection takes place at the cost of civic freedoms (Young 2003). To some extent this remains the masculine domination of the state described by Brown: the state acts as the provider of security but at the same time it requires obedience. However, the security state, in context of post-9/11, has both internal and external aspects: protection takes the form of domestic as well as foreign policies. The security state ultimately requires cooperative obedience at home and at the same time wages war abroad – not to conquer but to protect (Young 2003).

According to Young (2003), the security state can be constituted only in relation to the enemy. This enemy exists both inside and outside the security state. The inside one can be found in ungrateful citizens, “troublemakers”, persons or groups who for some reasons oppose to abide by the rules of the security state (Young 2003). They constitute a danger of disruption from inside. The security state requires collaborative obedience for the sake of all: the sovereign authority of the protector needs to be absolute. Any revolt or dissent must be suppressed. The citizens are, thus, made into dependents. The outside enemy can be understood as a threat to democratic values. The security state wages war abroad not because of the desire for conquest, but rather to protect its citizens in case of the aggressive attack from the outside as well as to liberate innocent ‘others’ (Young 2003).

Conceptualizing Security

The politics of protection, and the logic of masculinist protection in particular, is closely related to the notion of security: in this logic autonomy is traded for security. Although Young provides a very important, from the point of view of my research question, account of the politics of protection, she does not conceptualize security. Security is, however, a contested concept (Blanchard 2003). In this part I take advantage of Annick Wibben’s (2011) revision of the understanding of security in the context of post-2001.

State Security, Human Security and Feminist Critique

Security is a very powerful concept but it is not unambiguous. Historically, the meaning of security within the field of international relations was closely connected with militarism (Tickner 1992, Willett 2010, Wibben 2011). Until the end of the Cold War the understanding of security referred to the concept of “state security” and the protection of national borders (Wibben 2011). However, between the Cold War and the War on Terror this understanding was opened to a more holistic approach. The concept of “human security” developed in the 1990s encompassed a merit of new issues including economic, environmental, health and personal security (Wibben 2011). This was a sort of shift from territorial to people’s security with particular emphasis on the well-being of individuals (Kronsell and Svedberg 2012). Although human security was closer to feminist studies than state security, women remained invisible and security continued to be a gender-blind concept (Barnes and Olonisakin 2011). According to Wibben (2011), the concept of human security was not subversive but rather additive: its goal was to deepen existing structures instead of focusing on the production of the meaning of security. That is, human security included new aspects but it did not fundamentally challenge the notion (Wibben 2011). What is more, the definition of security was still imposed from “above” without consultation at the grassroots level. Although the adoption of the UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000 awoke the hope to include women’s perspectives into security studies, after the terrorist attack of 9/11 the dominant paradigm seems to have turned back to the idea of achieving security using military means, at least in the United States.

Despite the evolution of the meaning of security over time, the central security agent remains the same (Wibben 2011). States are considered the main actors on the international stage and at the same time, the primarily providers of security. Also in case of Resolution 1325, the primary responsibility for the implementation, including provision of security for women as well as accomplishment of international security, relies on states. In the traditional security studies that refer to both state security and most recently to human security concepts, the state is perceived as a solution to insecurity (Wibben 2011). However, feminist security studies show that while some states may act as the providers of security (for those who “belong”, in most cases citizens), other can actually be experienced rather as a source of insecurity (Tickner 1992, Wibben 2011). Nevertheless, states hold the power to define the threat. In both

state and human security, the concept of security is based on its relation to insecurity. Wibben argues that the existence of a threat as a source of insecurity is crucial to sovereignty of a state which can be ensured only in relation to a continuous danger: “[t]he lack of an identifiable threat produce a crisis for sovereignty” (2011:72). In traditional security studies that include both state and human security there are, therefore, two related superpowers: “us” and “them” where the latter constitute “our” imaginary enemy constantly liable to attack “us”. Hence, “them” function as the threat that propels “our” security efforts (Wibben 2011).

It is worth noting that both concepts of security, state security and human security, get involved in the politics of protection. Whereas human security for women (and men) is traded for their autonomy as active, political subjects, at the same time state security requires the citizens to resign from some of their liberties in order to provide the protection of national borders. Both are, however, gender-blind (Wibben 2011). Feminist studies of international relations challenged the conventional accounts of security based on its universal understanding (Wibben 2011). They showed that the meaning of security differs not only across time and cultures but may also be perceived differently by people speaking from various political, social or economical locations. Furthermore, the understanding of security proved to be very different for women and men (Barnes and Olonisakin 2011, Mobekk 2010). Wibben (2011) argues that any concept of security should, therefore, be analyzed without ignoring the instability, fluidity and uncertainty of the term. Following Wibben, while tracing the problematization of security within the US policy on Women, Peace and Security, the thesis will pay the attention not only to the understanding of what security means but also how and at what cost it can be achieved.

The United States after 9/11

The US understanding of security has been shaped in a very particular context. It was significantly influenced by the Cold War in which the Soviet Union used to function as the “radical, dangerous other” (Wibben 2011:67). Since 2001 this role seems to be overtaken by (or perhaps *passed to*) Afghanistan, Iraq and most recently to the Arab States.

The events of 9/11 were very quickly labeled a national security issue (Wibben 2011). Even before the Pentagon was attacked (the plane crashing into the World Trade Center could well be interpreted as the invasion on, for example, capitalism, according to Wibben (2011)), the

Bush Administration imposed a state-centric framework and immediately classified the events as an attack on the United States and Americans. Wibben argues that this narrative was strongly authoritative: “it not only impose[d] an authoritative account of the events, but it also shape[d] the possible responses and limit[ed] alternative presentations” (2011:57). Consequently, this narrative not only overshadowed other possible interpretations of the events but also provided rationale for further actions.

According to Young (2003), the United States in the context of post-9/11 became a security state. The US Government responded to the terrorist attack of 9/11 with a strong security alert, both at home and abroad (Young 2003). The Bush Administration reacted as the protector of innocent American citizens and since September 2001 a strong internal mobilization has continued to take place. In order to fulfill the rule of the protector, the US security state restricted civil liberties. This entailed both legal and policy changes in regard to basic democratic freedoms of the citizens (Young 2003). The control of the airports and other public spaces as well as other measures to keep people safe were introduced after 2001. The prerogative of the executive branch was significantly extended and this may be particularly interesting for this thesis since it departs from the analyses of a policy document issued by the Obama Administration. Shortly after the 9/11, the power of the US Congress to decide over military interventions was lifted. The power of the courts was restricted as well. As a result, the separation between legislative, executive and judiciary became imbalanced in favor of executive. Furthermore, in 2002 the Department of Homeland Security was created in order to protect the American territory from terrorist attacks. At the same time the budget on military spending considerably increased. In a very short time the American society shifted from a relatively liberal to an authoritarian one (Young 2003). However, policy changes occurred not only in regard to the domestic affairs. The US Government extended its mission from home to abroad. The rule of masculinist protection gave the rationale for waging war first in Afghanistan and shortly afterwards in Iraq. The US Government decided to initiate the battle for democracy and respect for human rights (Young 2003). Women were particularly targeted (Young 2003). Although previous campaigns organized by feminist organizations to raise awareness of women’s situation in the Middle East received hardly any attention from the US Government, after 2001 women’s rights gained an important place in the foreign policy strategies. The goal of women’s liberation served as the justification of the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq. The victimization of these women effectively put the US in the role of the protector (Young 2003).

To sum up, over the last decade security studies received slightly different reception in the United States and in Europe. Appeals to security became very powerful in the US in the context of post-9/11 and recalled the old Anglo-American concept of state security based on strategic studies, in which focus is almost exclusively on militarism and war. The US Government possibly moved back to the idea of achieving security with the help of military means (Wibben 2011). What is more, the national security discourse over the last decade was developed further and seems to influence the normative context of the US politics redefining, among others, the US policy on Women, Peace and Security.

Summary

This chapter presented a theoretical framework for examining the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. I started with introducing the landscape of feminist studies of international relations. The influence of the discourses on women and men as well as femininity and masculinity on the practices of war was outlined. Resolution 1325 was further discussed as an advocacy tool and two different assessments of this resolution were presented: an optimistic and a pessimistic one. The NAPs were described as both offering opportunities for the improvement of implementation of Resolution 1325 but also as creating risks such as adoption of selective approaches on Women, Peace and Security. Building on this, the last part of the chapter was dedicated to the protection pillar of Resolution 1325 that seems to have gained particular attention over the last decade. The politics of protection and the involvement of the notions of security were shown as problematic: trading autonomy for security may ultimately support male power and female subordination. Finally, the role of state as the provider of security was discussed and the political situation of the United States was briefly touched upon.

Chapter 2: METHODOLOGY

A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based.

(Foucault in Bacchi 2009:XV)

This thesis strongly relies on the methodological contributions of Carol Lee Bacchi (1999, 2000, 2009, Bacchi and Eveline 2010). Firstly, I take advantage of Bacchi's methodology to study policies called "What's the Problem Represented to Be?" (hereinafter: the WPR). The very basic idea of this methodology is not to take policies for granted but consider them as the very subject of interrogation. In other words, instead of studying the relationship between policy claims and "the reality", the WPR aims to start the interrogation earlier and with the help of a set of questions challenge the policy itself. Secondly, I make use of Bacchi's account of "policy as discourse" which encourages analyzing policy as a strategic and political process. The invocation of the notion "discourse" shows why a meaningful change may be difficult to achieve. Thirdly and finally, I employ Bacchi's account of gender analysis procedures and the division into differences and gender relations models in my research. The two models are used in order to show long-term gendering effects of different policies.

What's the Problem Represented to Be?

The "What's the Problem Represented to Be?" approach introduced by Bacchi challenges "the commonplace view that policy is the government's best attempt to deal with 'problems'" (2009:1). Bacchi (2009) argues that policies are not tools created to solve already existing problems, but they instead shape the meaning of the problems to be addressed. This meaning-making process has the political dimension as it builds on a set of political assumptions. Interrogating problem representations is, therefore, crucial to recognize this political aspect: "[b]ecause *every policy* constitutes a problematization, it is fair to say that, in effect, we are governed *through* problematizations rather than through policies" (Bacchi 2009:31, emphasis original). Since I entered the field feeling suspicious about the US policy on Women, Peace and Security and its possible effects on gender equality as an objective and on the position of women in the context of conflict and post-conflict, the approach of Bacchi seemed to offer the

necessarily tools to scrutinize this policy already at the level of the formulation of the problem.

The basic idea of the WPR approach is to “read off” proposed policies, identify problem representations and “work backwards”: researchers start with a policy and “work back” in order to figure out what the problem is represented to be and then dig into the premises and assumption that enabled this problematization (Bacchi 2009). Scholars are therefore encouraged to research problematizations in selected government policies. These policies may be expressed in policy statements, parliamentary debates, government reports, pieces of legislation, court decisions and so forth. However, in the WTP approach the selection of texts is already an interpretative task (Bacchi 2009).

The Critique of Conventional Approaches

The WPR builds on the critique of the traditional way of studying policies. According to the conventional approaches¹⁵ a policy is an action introduced in order to solve an identifiable problem which exists outside (and before) the policy-making processes. In these approaches a problem must be first found and then fixed. This traditional “problem-solving” approaches to studying policies gives an impression that societies are generally functioning well: when some problems appear policymakers create policies to fix them. Ultimately, in this understanding, a policy is necessarily “a good thing”, a tool to solve a problem (Bacchi 2009). Resolution 1325 and following policies on the Women, Peace and Security agenda seem to be perceived similarly. Violence against women or their exclusion in conflict and post-conflict settings are identified as a problem. Thus, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 and ultimately encouraged the Member States to adopt national policies on Women, Peace and Security (www.peacewomen.org). The adoption of NAPs is considered a necessarily “good thing” although national policies can offer opportunity as well as produce risks in regard to the Women, Peace and security agenda (Swaine 2013). The countries that developed national action plans on Women, Peace and Security are considered (stepping into) “well-

¹⁵ By a traditional or conventional approach to study policies Bacchi (2009) means the approach attempting to measure or assess the implementation of a particular policy. A policy and the conceptualization of a problem it touches upon are usually taken for granted in this approach and only the implementation gap is scrutinized. The WPR approach as an unconventional way of studying policies starts from challenging the policy as already imposing the problem and possible solutions (Bacchi 2009).

functioning” (or at least the adoption of a NAP is regarded as an achievement). The problem these countries face, according to the traditional way of studying policies, is the gap between the policy claims and the implementation on the ground.

Whereas the traditional approaches commonly focus on difficulties connected with the implementation of policies, the WPR starts in a different place. The WPR redirects attention to problematizations and by doing so challenges the very idea of a policy being a reaction to an exogenous problem. The WPR methodology recognizes a policy as productive rather than reactive: a policy actually produces, constitutes and shapes the meaning of the problem to be addressed (rather than responds to an exogenous problem). However, “a problem” in the WPR approach does not simply mean “a difficult task” but its understanding is already determined in the policy. Hence, in the place of “problem-solving”, Bacchi (2009) proposes “problem-questioning”. Referring to Bacchi’s approach, this thesis addresses the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as productive in the sense that instead of viewing the policy as solving an exogenous problem, I will analyze this policy as already involved in the creation of the problem. Consequently, my research question does not focus on the challenges of translating the US policy on Resolution 1325 into practice but rather on the style of problematization evoked within the policymaking processes¹⁶. Instead of asking whether the US policy solves the problem, following Bacchi, my question is “What’s the Problem Represented to be?”.

Problem, Representations and Problem Representations

Problems and problematizations¹⁷ exist within rather than outside proposed policies. For this reason they are central to the policy-making processes. However, the understanding of these terms differs in the approach of Bacchi from those implied by the traditional approach. Starting with the first term, “a problem” in the WPR is not conventionally understood as “a difficult task” but rather refers to “the kind of change implied in a particular policy proposal” (Bacchi 2009:XI). At the same time, representations do not oppose “the real”. According to

¹⁶ To be precise, the development of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security can be regarded as the implementation of Resolution 1325 at the national level. However, by ignoring the implementation challenges I mean that I am not going to focus on the gaps between policy claims and practices on the ground.

¹⁷ I use the terms “problematization” and “problem representation” interchangeably.

Bacchi, they instead “are practices through which things take on meaning and value” (Shapiro in Bacchi 2009:35). Ultimately, “a problem representation” is “the way in which a particular policy ‘problem’ is constituted *in the real*” (Bacchi 2009:35, emphasis original). This clarification is important from the point of view of the thesis: for example, the problem in the US policy on Women, Peace and Security will be discussed not simply “violence against women” but rather “the protection of women”. Similarly, the interrogation of the problem representation will focus on the process that makes it seem reasonable and rightful.

Theoretical Foundations

The WPR approach is built upon the achievements of four theoretical formations: social constructionism, poststructuralism, governmentality studies and feminist body theory (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). According to social constructionism knowledge is a product of social forces: it does not exist outside the social world but is rather constructed within it. Therefore, taken for granted assumptions about problem representations needs to be scrutinized. Poststructuralism, on the other hand, encompasses the political dimension of knowledge and refers to the Foucauldian power-knowledge nexus where power does not exist without knowledge, and vice versa (Foucault 1977). Poststructuralism also brings up the term “discourse” showing that neither concepts nor categories can exist outside it. Finally, poststructuralism invokes the anti-essential status of political subjects, and pays attention to the process of subjectification and its political consequences (Bacchi and Eveline 2010).

Whereas poststructuralism emphasizes the discursive and subjectification effects, feminist body theory focuses on the lived effects: the effects on life and death. This tradition shows how policy frames can have “real” consequences for living bodies, for instance their influence on people’s access to resources. Finally, governmentality studies focus on the processes in which rule takes place. These studies refer to the broad understanding of government but in this view political processes involve not only the traditionally understood state apparatus but also a rich set of institutions and organizations, including research communities (Bacchi and Eveline 2010).

Governing Processes

The WPR approach highlights that policies have a cultural dimension (Bacchi 2009). Policies operate in a specific historical and geographical context. In the case of the US, the policy on Women, Peace and Security is strongly shaped by the context of the terrorist attack of 9/11. The WPR approach is therefore concerned not only with the role of the state apparatus in governing processes but also with the indirect influences of deep cultural premises (for example based on the politics of protection). Since the WPR considers policy as a cultural product, the fieldwork which I undertook in the US was very fruitful in placing the US policy in a broader context.

Showing that the governing processes are deeply rooted in cultural values, this methodology blurs the distinction between the state and civil society. Nevertheless, governments in most cases hold a privileged stand in the policymaking process and in the construction of problematizations, since they have access to technologies that are used to manage the society (Bacchi 2009). Thus, governments' understandings of problems usually become dominant and they are further elaborated on in the legislations.

Although the WPR is concerned with premises which underpin problem representations, this approach is not interested in intentionality. Furthermore, the WPR does not suggest that policy-making process involves manipulation. Instead, this methodology focuses on identifying "deep conceptual premises" included in the policy and the problem representation (Bacchi 2009:XIX), and showing how the representations of the problem matter. As Bacchi argues: "the goal is to understand policies *better than* policy makers" (2009:XIX, emphasis original). For these reasons, the thesis will not investigate the relationship between the postulates of policymakers and "reality". Nor do I intend to trace strategic or deliberate framings of problem representations. Ultimately, Policymakers' intentions will be left out.

Interrogation of Policy: Six Questions

Productive and constitutive understanding of problematizations has consequences for their interrogation. Similarly to Bacchi, I believe that "[o]nly part of a story is being told" in a problem representation (2009:XII). The problem representations have, thus, to be probed to see what they left out. When investigating the problematization of the US policy on Women,

Peace and Security, I will critically research the presuppositions which enabled this problem representation but also its implications and possible effects. Following the WPR approach the thesis is a critical rather than descriptive form of policy interrogation: the objective is to track the styles of problematization by applying a set of critical questions to policy proposals (see below). In other words, instead of describing the US policy proposal on Resolution 1325, I will try to critically examine the problem representation of this policy.

Six Questions

The WPR approach involves six questions that aim to “read off” a policy. Answering these questions involves “working backwards”¹⁸ to discuss the representation of a problem. These six exercises investigate how particular problem representations matter in the policymaking processes and what solutions they automatically entail. All the questions will be applied to the analysis of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security in “Chapter 3”.

The first question (Q1) is at the same time the name of the approach: “What’s the problem represented to be?”. This is a clarification exercise aiming to identify the representation of a problem in a specific policy: what kind of problem is implied by the US policy on Women, Peace and Security and how it is represented? Questions two to six will develop this first inquiry.

The second question (Q2) aims to reveal the specific premises that underpinned the problem representation: “What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem?”. Or in other words: “What is assumed? What is taken for granted? What is not questioned?” (Bacchi 2009:5). This inquiry aims to uncover concepts, categories and key words that a policy and ultimately its problem representation are filled with (Bacchi 2009). The concepts are often founded on deep cultural values and this question discusses the meaning that is assigned to these concepts. This is a reflection upon what must be in place for the representation of a problem to be coherent. The thesis’ objective is, therefore, to uncover the main concepts and keywords that underpin the problem representation in the US policy on

¹⁸ Deconstructing or decomposing seem both to be relevant terms too, though Bacchi (2009) does not use them.

Resolution 1325. The thesis also scrutinizes generalizations about women and men and gender power relations that make the US policy thinkable.

The third question (Q3), “How has this representation of the problem come about?” examines the origins of a specific problem representation. According to Bacchi (2009), each problem representation is a sort of event produced in a historical process. Thus, problem representations are not fixed or stable but they are changing over time. This question seeks to figure out how a problem gained its particular shape within the policymaking processes. In this exercise the genealogy of the problem representation in the US policy will be traced by reflecting on its specific developments over time. My research draws on mechanisms in which the problem representation of the US policy on Resolution 1325 came about. I further try to address how some conditions (the terrorist attack of 9/11 in particular) have influenced this development and made the problem representations dominating over others.

The next question (Q4), “What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?”, explores the critical potential of the WRP approach. The goal of this exercise is to reflect on the silent places within the political discourse and to challenge the unspoken. An important element of this thesis is to recognize the limits of the problem representations in the US policy: “what fails to be problematized?”, what is simplified, misrepresented or mystified (Bacchi 2009:12). According to Bacchi, cross-cultural comparisons and juxtapositions are very fruitful tools to discuss this question and may help to capture differences between specific problem representations. Therefore, as an answer to the fourth question the thesis will involve the analysis of an alternative problem representation: the problematization created within the Norwegian policy on the Women, Peace and Security agenda. These two problem representations will be further juxtaposed.

The fifth question (Q5), “What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?” takes inspiration from poststructural discourse psychology and feminist body theory. This exercise aims to investigate how policies may affect people’s lives. In particular, Bacchi identifies three overlapping types of effects which are produced by problem representations: discursive effects, subjectification effects and lived effects. Discursive effects “follow from the limits imposed on what can be thought and said” (Bacchi 2009:15). The reflection upon

them shows why it is difficult to think differently and why some ideas can be closed off for some people. Subjectification effects relate to “the ways in which subjects and subjectivities are constituted in discourse” (Bacchi 2009:15). Subjectification effects show, furthermore, how people are produced as particular subjects and which positions are available for whom. These effects may also project on who is perceived as responsible for the specific problem. Finally, lived effects refer to “the impact on life and death” (Bacchi 2009:15). They are the very material effects on people’s life, such as life opportunities or the access to resources. In practice discursive, subjectification and lived effects are overlapping and it is difficult to separate from each other – as I will show when discussing the effects of the US policy on Resolution 1325 on women/femininity and complementary on men/masculinity.

In this exercise Bacchi also poses several sub-questions that will be crucial for assessing the impact of the US policy on social relations: “What is likely to change with this representation of the ‘problem’? What is likely to stay the same? Who is likely to benefit from this representation of the ‘problem’? Who is likely to be harmed? How does the attribution of responsibility for the ‘problem’ affect those so targeted and the perceptions of the rest of community about who is to ‘blame’?” and so forth (2009:70-71). The thesis will analyze how the problem representations of the US policy on Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions may effectively empower or disempower particular political subjects. I will further investigate what kind of effects the US NAP can have on gender equality as a long-term project.

The last question (Q6), “How/where is this representation of the ‘problem’ produced, disseminated and defended?”, reflects upon the means and technologies used to popularize a particular problem representation, make it legitimate and dominant. By undertaking this particular exercise I will address the role of media and other institutions or agencies in the dissemination of the US policy’s problem representations and its partial success. Since this question is closely related to the third question about the genealogy of a problem representation, they will be both discussed together in “Chapter 3”.

Answering the set of six questions is a work backwards to uncover the assumptions and presupposition that underpinned a particular problem representation. These exercises aim to

identify the problem representation of a researched policy and its possible effects and implications. The next step of the analysis will be interrogating a policy as a discourse.

Policy as Discourse

According to Bacchi, “policy is ‘strategic and political process’” and needs to be examined as such (2000:50). Another concept that she developed and that will be particularly useful for the analysis of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security is “policy as discourse” (Bacchi 2000). In the text, “Policy as Discourse: What Does It Mean? Where Does It Get Us?” (2000), Bacchi analyzes different policy-as-discourse¹⁹ approaches and she is particularly interested in what can be accomplished by the employment of the notion “discourse”.

The understanding of policy as discourse usually entails the belief that categorization is a social practice (Bacchi 2000). This basically means that concepts and categories are not descriptive but rather productive. The way that they are formed already serves ones’ political goals: it is possible to define and redefine them according to the desired political purposes (although this process is not necessarily intentional or even conscious). Bacchi emphasizes the political dimension of meaning making: the activity of defining is a political one already. Thus, defining the notion of discourse poses a serious challenge: as Bacchi argues, “we cannot provide definitions of discourse because the whole idea of discourse is that definitions play an important part in delineating ‘knowledge’” (2000:46). What is more, “[b]ecause definitions have these effects, they require scrutiny, not replication” (Bacchi 2000:46).

According to Bacchi (2009), problems are usually represented in the way that mystifies the power structures which produce individuals as subjects personally responsible for their own failures. Therefore, policy-as-discourse approaches draw attention to power dynamics that hinder a number of changes. These approaches are critical towards the commonplace belief that problems are ‘out there’ and instead, they recognize both problems and solutions as already shaped and defined within discourse. They further show that framing problems in one way imposes specific solutions to them and can hide and hinder other. Policies are not simply

¹⁹ Bacchi (2000) uses “policy-as-discourse” as an adjective, e.g. policy-as-discourse approaches, policy-as-discourse theorists etc. Otherwise, she uses the phrase “policy as discourse”. I stick to her usage.

tools to solve problems but they involve a set of political interests. Hence, policies often maintain the status quo instead of advancing political change (Bacchi 2000).

As a matter of fact people do not share the same power over the dominant discourse(s) (Bacchi 2000). Whereas some can benefit from specific constructions of the problem, others may be harmed. Some can be empowered by the discourse, others rather disempowered. This thesis examines the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as a discourse possibly formed under the logic of masculinist protection. The thesis pays particular attention to the processes in which the US policy may result in empowering or disempowering different political subjects. I further reflect upon why change in regard to Women, Peace and Security may be difficult to accomplish. Applying the analysis's outcome of the reading off the US policy using the set of six questions, the thesis will finally discuss limitations imposed by the US policy and how they may support or hinder gender equality as an objective.

Gender Analysis and Social Change

The US policy on Women, Peace and Security is an example of a gender analysis procedure which can be understood as “a form of policy analysis associated with the equality policy initiative called gender mainstreaming” (Bacchi and Eveline 2010:1). Gender analysis procedures can be framed differently within different policies and those various framings have impact on gender (in)equality (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). According to Carol Bacchi and Joan Eveline (2010), the common goal of these different approaches is to transform politics. However, they may differ in what they can accomplish and some of them may actually reinforce the existing inequalities instead of eliminating them, in a long-term perspective (Bacchi and Eveline 2010).

Differences Model and Gender Relations Model

Bacchi and Eveline (2010) distinguish two main approaches to gender analysis of policies: a differences model and a gender relations model. Although this division is simplified and does not necessarily impose the rule that each type of gender analysis can be classified as either-or, it captures the substantial difference between analyzing gender as an attribute (a noun) or a relation (a verb). The differences approach is currently the dominant model of gender analysis, according to Bacchi and Eveline (2010). In this approach women and men are

considered separate categories of people who need different treatment: women and men, basically, have different needs and considerations. In the differences approach, gender is considered an attribute of a person, something that people “have”: a (described) difference (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). Here, gender, as a term, operates as a noun. In the gender relations approach, gender, on the contrary, functions as a verb. The gender relations approach starts with destabilization of the categories “woman” and “man” and redirects attention to the power dynamics between them: this approach is based on the assumption that there are unequal power relations between women and men and gender is understood not as an attribute of a person but rather as a relation of inequality. Gender as such produces hierarchies: not only between women and men, but also between women and women, as well as men and men (Bacchi and Eveline 2010).

The differences model and the gender relations approach involve different gender equality projects (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). The aim of the differences approach is commonly based on equal opportunities understood as equal access. In this model women and men are different and because of these differences they do not share the same access to existing structures of opportunity. Therefore, women need to get access to the social and economic structures of opportunity that “naturally” seem to favor men due to their different attributes. In other words, women should get different treatment in order to be better integrated into existing structures that privilege masculine norms (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). Ultimately, the differences approach expects women to be more like men in order to succeed. As Bacchi and Eveline claim “[t]his approach can lead to proposals that women’s different needs have to be met to allow them to participate in a “man’s world” (2010:99). Thus, women are perceived as “guilty” of their “failure”: their different attributes are the obstacles that keep them behind men (Bacchi and Eveline 2010).

Whereas equal opportunity policies developed in the differences approach aim to ensure that women and men have the same access to existing structures of opportunity, the gender relations approach, on the contrary, focuses on the equal outcome (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). Here the policies do not aim to create equal access for women but rather to transform the existing structures so that women and men can in the end benefit from them equally. As Bacchi and Eveline (2010) claim, this is a long-term equality project in which the problem of gender inequality cannot be simply “solved” once forever but the attention has to be

continuously paid to how gender as a relationship of inequality is reproduced in different policies.

Policies exercise productive power, according to Bacchi and Eveline (2010), and no policy is gender neutral. Regardless whether policies are created within the differences approach or the gender relations model, they all have gendering effects. Doing gender is always a part of the policymaking processes: Bacchi and Eveline claim that policies operate as gendering processes, they produce people as gendered subjects, “embodied ‘men’ and ‘women’” (2010:18). According to the authors, whereas the differences approach may maintain the existing power structures, the gender relations approach has the critical potential to challenge the hierarchical power dynamics. They both, however, have gendering effects.

The thesis takes advantage of Bacchi’s division on the differences and the gender relations approaches. My research emphasizes the gendering effects of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security, as well as the influence of this policy on gender equality in the long haul. The use of a cross-cultural comparison between the US and the Norwegian policies on Women, Peace and Security will help demonstrate how utilizing a particular understanding of gender can result in maintaining or challenging the status quo based on gender inequalities.

Positionality and Reflexivity

According to Kim V. England (1994), the epistemological security of positivist empiricism is gone and so is the split between the object and the subject of research which used to form a prerequisite for objectivity. Consequently, the politics of knowledge production must be critically approached. Gillian Rose (1997) defines reflexivity as “a strategy for marking geographical knowledges as situated”. In this sense, reflexivity requires the critical acknowledgement of one’s positionality which refers to a reflection upon one’s location and its influence on the obtained data and its analysis. According to England, “[a] researcher is positioned by her/his gender, age, ”race”/ethnicity, sexual identity, and so on, as well as by her/his biography, all of which may inhibit or enable certain research method insights in the field” (1994:249). However, “[y]et, as researchers we cannot escape the contradictory position in which we find ourselves” (England 194:249).

Reflexivity is a critical component of the WPR. This approach suggests that researchers are a part of policymaking processes as well as of meaning-making activities. Thus, as scholars we need to recognize the inside location within the field we try to interrogate: as researchers we play an active role in constricting “the reality” we aim to examine. Bacchi and Eveline encourage to challenge our own problematizations and taken for granted assumptions. As scholars, we should recognize our “political investments in research practice” through reflexive self-scrutiny and critical self-problematization (2010:341). Last but not least, this means that applying the WPR approach to one’s research is an intervention which has power effects.

According to Bacchi, scholars who refer to the understanding of policy as discourse, as I do, “tend to be political progressives, loosely positioned on the left of political spectrum” (2000:46). They are advocates for social change. These researchers invoke the term “discourse” in order to prove that it is generally difficult to achieve social change not only due to the political opposition but, perhaps more importantly, because of the limitations imposed by the dominant discourse. Those limits stipulate who can say what as well as how problems can be thought about. I would like to position myself within this landscape. However, the position I speak from is a complex one: my origins are those of “the Second World”, influenced by living in “the First World”, and particularly in “woman-friendly” Scandinavia (Hernes 1987). I am a white educated (how privileged!) woman who has had a chance to change locations. I am a feminist deeply believing in the equality of women and men and I wish my research to contribute not only to the production of feminist knowledge but perhaps more importantly to the critique and transformation of patriarchal system we live in. As a politically active woman I have to admit a sort of political schizophrenia in between research and political activism per se: at times it has been challenging (though necessary) to combine these two activities because what we propose as activists we often criticize as researchers. And so do I in this thesis. For instance, as civil society workers we strategically use “sexual difference” trying to influence the UN Security Council or governments²⁰. We say that women are mothers. That they are nurturing and empathetic and inherently peaceful. We say all this because we believe that women must be included in all peace processes and although

²⁰ See more about strategic essentialism in *The Post-colonial Critic* (Spivak 1990).

this is one of the most obvious democratic goals, the democratic argument often turns out to be insufficient. Then we approach the same field as researchers and we criticize the essentializing tendencies that have been evoked in the process – and this is what I am doing in this thesis.

I further realize my critical approach towards American politics when it comes to the marriage between military objectives and the objective of women's liberation, initiated by the American authorities shortly after September 2001 and still having influence on American domestic and foreign politics (Young 2003). Although this approach must have had influence on the data obtained, I would not say that it undermined its credibility. I entered the field maybe not with a particular agenda but with lots of skepticism towards the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the US policy on Resolution 1325 in particular. However, when searching to identify traces of masculinist protection in the US policy documents, it was, in a way, difficult to assess that something is inherently “wrong” with the US policy since some of these discourses can be found already in Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions. That was one more reason to involve the analysis of the Norwegian case although the thesis did not aim to provide a full comparison. Involving the example of Norway brought some transparency because it allowed me to show that the problem of Women, Peace and Security can, indeed, be thought about differently. It did not, however, help to challenge my critical stand towards American politics after 9/11. Quite the contrary, in this comparison Norway functions as a “better example” which places the US policy even more in the dark.

I struggled with my critical stand. Although at the starting point the US policy on Women, Peace and Security seemed to resemble for me the discourses on oppressed women in Afghanistan or Iraq that appeared after 9/11, I discovered that this case is at the same time distinct. I attempted to make the research process transparent and to carefully and systematically search for alterations and alternative representations of women/femininity and men/masculinity than these created within the policy on oppressed women in Afghanistan or Iraq (Young 2003). Indeed, I managed to find some and their subversive potential is addressed in “Chapter 3”. Moreover, shortly before the final revision of “Chapter 3” I undertook a very straightforward “reflexivity exercise” based on the count of keywords in order to once again challenge my possible presuppositions. The results of this exercise can be found in Appendix 2. However, I have to highlight that this was just an exercise to challenge

my own assumptions about the US policy – and the methodology used in this thesis is different (qualitative instead of quantitative for the very first) and the outcomes of the exercise are not included in the main analysis. The exercise helped me emphasize more the role of women as peace agents and less as victims of violence.

Last but not least, I believe that when trying to interrogate the problem representation of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security, what I offer actually is yet another problem representation of this problem representation.

Summary

The goal of this chapter was to introduce the methodological contributions that will be applied to my research. The WPR approach was presented at first as a critique of the traditional way of studying policies which concentrate on the implementation gap. The theoretical foundations of this approach in poststructuralism, social constructionism, governmentality studies and feminist body theory were outlined. The set of six questions was described in depth. Furthermore, the policy-as-discourse approach was examined and I particularly aimed to show that the invocation of the term “discourse” might be useful to understand why a meaningful change is difficult to achieve. Bacchi’s division into the differences model and the gender relations model was further discussed in order to scrutinize the transformative potential of different gender analysis procedures. Last but definitely not least, I critically addressed my position as a researcher speaking from a particular location and I discussed its possible impact on the credibility and validity of the data obtained.

Chapter 3: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

[T]he politics of protection are generically problematic for women and for feminism.

(Brown 1995:170)

The primary aim of this chapter is to interrogate the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. Specifically, I discuss the main research question of the thesis which is as follows: How does the US policy involve the politics of protection? The chapter also reflects upon a number of supporting questions: Is this policy organized according to the logic of masculinist protection? Does the policy produce women as autonomous subjects or rather as docile and regulated subjects? What kind of effects can this policy have on gender equality as an objective? This chapter follows the threefold objective of the thesis and is therefore divided into three parts. Using the set of six questions²¹ introduced by Bacchi (2009), the first part “reads off” the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. The textual priority is given to the main policy document on Resolution 1325 at the national level: *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* (the US NAP/the NAP). The problem representation of the US policy is juxtaposed with the Norwegian policy on Resolution 1325, as represented in *Norway’s Strategic Plan 2011-13: Women, Peace and Security* (the NSP). The second part of the chapter interrogates the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as discourse. Building on the analysis of the set of Bacchi’s questions, this part investigates the politics of protection in the US policy. In particular, I search for the traces of the logic of masculinist protection. Finally, the third and last part of this chapter analyzes the transformative potential of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security in regard to the objective of gender equality. The US policy is once again juxtaposed with the Norwegian one.

The US as the Provider of Security

This part provides the analysis of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security following the set of six questions introduced by Bacchi (2009). I start with the investigation of the problem representation produced by the NAP (question one). The main concept supporting the problem representation is analyzed and the keyword highlighted, as well as the involved

²¹ See “Chapter 2” and in particular pp. 46-50.

assumptions and presuppositions (question two). The genealogy of the problem representation is scrutinized together with the process of its dissemination (question three and six). The chapter further discusses the effects that the problem representation may have on women/femininity (question five). In order to show what fails to be problematized in this particular problem representation and how the problem can be thought about differently, the analysis involves a juxtaposition with the case of the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security (question four).

(Dis)Empowerment and (In)Security (Q1²²)

The first question of the “What’s the Problem Represented to Be?”-approach (the WPR) aims to identify what problem is produced by a specific policy. The very first two sentences of the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security already constitute the central problematization of the US policy:

The goal of this National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security is as simple as it is profound: to empower half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security (NAP 2011:1).

The changed proposed by the US NAP concerns empowering women in conflict zones for national and global security to be accomplished. This policy seems, therefore, to amplify two central problems: women’s disempowerment in conflict and post-conflict settings and national and global security problem. As will be shown, these two problems are interrelated and mutually referential.

Women’s disempowerment is further represented as a two-folded problem: firstly, women are abused in the context of war (“violence against women, particularly forms of sexual violence [...], is increasingly recognized as a facet of many recent conflicts” (NAP 2011:6)) and secondly, they are excluded from the whole spectrum of activities connected with peace processes (women are “excluded from the negotiating table and the benefits of peace” (NAP 2011:26)). In other words, violence against women, and particularly sexual and gender-based violence, persists before, throughout and after armed conflicts, and at the same time, women’s

²² Q1, Q2, ..., Q6 stand for Bacchi’s six questions presented in “Chapter 2”.

voices are not heard: neither their early warnings of approaching conflicts, nor the articulation of their needs in peacebuilding and reconstruction processes. These issues, however, do not constitute an independent problem yet. Women's disempowerment poses a serious challenge to national and global security and this will be the overriding imperative of the whole NAP. When included as "meaningful participants" women can contribute to the end of armed conflicts and to better efficiency of reconstruction processes (NAP 2011). Women's empowerment ultimately leads to "lower poverty, higher economic growth, greater agricultural productivity, better nutrition and education of children, and other outcomes vital to the success of communities" (NAP 2011:8). Without the inclusion of women lasting peace and security efforts both at the national and international levels are likely to fail. Therefore, the main objective is represented as "the goal of sustainable peace and security for all" (NAP 2011:2). Participation and protection of women serve as a tool to achieve this goal: "the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability will be *central* to the United States' efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies" (NAP 2011:1, emphasis original). Finally, although the US NAP aims to "empower half the world's population" which would refer to *all* women, the US policy on Women, Peace and Security appears to target exclusively women in countries in the situation of conflict and war. The NAP particularly mentions the conflict zones "from Kosovo to Rwanda" (NAP 2011:8) or "from the Balkans to Africa" (NAP 2011:6).

To sum up, the main problem is represented to be women's disempowerment that ultimately poses a challenge to national and global security. Empowering women, that is, protecting them from violence and including them in all peace processes, is seen to be a tool for achieving security. The main target of the US policy are local women²³.

National and Global Security (Q2)

Whereas the first question of the WPR approach identifies the problem representation in a particular policy, the second one focuses on examining implicit or explicit binaries, keywords and concepts that the laid foundations for these representation. Both the keyword and the key

²³ Terminology note: whenever using "local women" or "local men" I refer to women and men in conflict zones as opposed to "peacekeepers" that stands for (Western/American) cohort sent to conflict zones.

concept of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security refer to security: while I identified the key concept to be national and global security, the keyword is simply “security”. The interest of the US authorities in protecting and engaging women does not appear to be primarily motivated by the democratic value of gender equality. Instead, the very first objective of the NAP is presented as empowering women within the framework of security efforts: “the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability will be *central* to the United States’ efforts to promote security, prevent, respond to, and resolve conflict, and rebuild societies” (NAP 2011:1, emphasis original). This quote may actually imply that the US Government is not particularly interested in women’s rights outside this framework, that is, when they do not contribute to lasting peace and stability. Although security is an omnipresent concept (mentioned several times on almost each page of the NAP), the NAP does not explicitly stipulate which conceptualization of security the US policy refers to. Security is by no means defined or problematized and it is hardly nuanced. It is, however, apparently acknowledged a necessary “good thing” – for all.

The NAP seems to allude to two concepts of security which intertwine in the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. The first concept, “state security”, refers to strategic studies where security is basically identified with the protection of territory. Security is “achieved” when peace agreements are signed and armed violence is officially ended. Although the NAP does not explicitly mention using military means, both national and global security efforts seem to rely on the protection of national borders, and the United States borders in particular, following the logic that when peace and stability are accomplished in the countries that found themselves in the situation of war and insecurity, they are less likely to attack the US. According to the second concept, “human security”, security is not simply understood as the official end of war but it exceeds to the wellbeing of a community after armed conflict and therefore, includes the goals of reduction of poverty, economic growth, access to education and so forth. The US NAP refers to these considerations as well and further includes in the security efforts education, health, security of a person and other “critical societal priorities and needs required for lasting and just peace” (NAP 2011:3). As will be shown, local women (as apparently opposed to local men) have the tendency to think about security in this broader framework and this is one of the reasons for their protection and inclusion (NAP 2011).

The NAP draws no line between national and global security but is rather “one-size-fits-all-model”: the aim of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security is to achieve “sustainable peace and security for all” (NAP 2011:2). Feminist international relations studies criticized the universal account of security based on its homogenized understanding once for ever and once for all (Wibben 2011). Thus, not only the concept of “security for all” seems to be rather illusionary but also security for some may be predicated upon insecurity for others. Therefore, the critical questions are “Whose security matters?” (Wibben 2011) and “Who is being secured by security policies?” (Blanchard 2003). A larger question which I will be trying to find an answer to in later parts of this chapter, in the light of the politics of protection, is: Whose security for whose benefit? And finally: How much does it cost to be provided with this security/protection?

Reassuming, the primarily interest of the US policy on Resolution 1325 is not gender equality but rather national and global security that was also identified as the main concept that this policy is based upon. Women are to be empowered within the framework of security efforts. Security as a concept is not problematized and the NAP implies “one-size-fits-all-model”.

Security State and Resolution 1325 (Q3/6)

The WPR approach is concerned with the genealogy of a problem representation. Whereas the third question draws on the context in which this problematization came about, the sixth question focuses on the dissemination of the problem. These two questions are analyzed here together since they both search for the context of the problem representation. The problem of the abuse and the exclusion of women is presented as already addressed for at least some time despite the fact that the NAP is the first formal document on the Women, Peace and Security agenda issued by the US authorities. According to the NAP, the US efforts

[W]ill *complement* and enhance existing initiatives to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment, ensure respect for human rights, and address the needs of vulnerable populations in crisis and conflict environments (NAP 2011:1).

The NAP promises to “accelerate, institutionalize and better coordinate” previous efforts (NAP 2011:1). This may mean that, when the US Government refers to its earlier accomplishments in this regard, it most probably relates to the policy on women in

developing countries, particularly Afghan and Iraqi women, which began shortly after the terrorist attack of September 2001.

The problem representation of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security appeared in a particular context, somehow in the nexus of the influence of the events of September 2001 and its aftermath, and the impact of the UN Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions. The US policy on Women, Peace and Security is, therefore, a sort of hybrid interconnecting the imperialist reactions that appeared after the terrorist attack and used women's rights to justify wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Young 2003) and the first international recognition of the importance of empowering and protecting women in conflict and post-conflict settings (Barnes 2011).

Resolution 1325 was adopted in October 2000, nearly a year before the terrorist attack (Barnes 2011). At this time the US interest in the human rights of women in Afghanistan, Iraq or possibly other developing countries in the Global South was rather faint: as Young argues "neither Clinton nor Bush evinced any concern for the situation of women under the Taliban before the war [on terror]" (2003:18). The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in September 2001 elicited a particularly strong security alert in the United States (Wibben 2011, see more in "Chapter 1"). However, the US Government, developing the structures of the security state, reacted not only with intensified security provisions within the state but also with military interventions abroad (Young 2003). Women's rights played an important role in justifying the bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq (Young 2003). It evoked what Young calls "a protection racket" which refers to "state's relation to women under a system of male domination" and basically means that people who do not necessarily want to "benefit" from offered protection become those in the biggest danger because the state perceived them as suspicious (2003:14).

The US considerations about women's protection were developed further also within the UN system. As the NAP notifies, the US played an important role in drafting three later resolutions on Women, Peace and Security at the Security Council: Resolution 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010). All of these resolutions have a strong focus on the protection of women from sexual and gender-based violence. The US authorities did not, however, play such a leading role for example in drafting Resolution 1889 (2009) which emphasizes the

importance of women's participation in post-conflict settings. That may show the particular interest of the US in protection rather than in women's rights in a broader framework of Resolution 1325.

The UN Security Council concerned with the poor implementation of Resolution 1325 called on the UN Member States in the annual report on Women, Peace and Security from 2004 to develop national policy documents (www.peacewomen.org). What seems to be puzzling is that in spite of the active role of the US authorities in pushing the women's agenda forward within the UN system (and particularly the agenda focusing on the protection), the US Government was relatively slow in the introduction of its national policy on the UN resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, although the policy on women and war was actively and continuously evoked in the wars with Afghanistan and Iraq. The first national action plans appeared in 2005 and 2006 and the Scandinavian countries, including Norway, were undoubtedly pioneers in the process of elaboration of policy documents at the national level. The US Government did not introduce the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security until December 2011 when it found itself in the third "top" ten countries that developed NAPs (www.peacewomen.org).

The US NAP on Women, Peace and Security is not a well-known document and the average American is very likely not to be aware of its existence. Therefore, the dissemination of the problem representation seems to build on previous images of women in developing countries. The role of the media and the language of fear as well as of previous representations of Afghan and Iraqi women need to be considered. According to Wibben (2011), media and mobilization of the language of fear after the terrorist attack significantly influenced the success of the appeal to security and women's rights' protection. The commonplace perception of the problem of Women, Peace and Security in the US is most probably based on the images of Afghan women in burkas oppressed by their men and culture. This does not, however, fully reflect the dominant representation of the NAP which, under the influence of Resolution 1325, rather refers to abused women with the potential to become peace agents. As will be shown below, they are oppressed but they are peacemakers whose exclusion is a blow to security efforts (NAP 2011).

To sum up, the problem representation of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security is affected by the context of post-9/11. However, formed under the influence of Resolution 1325 this policy is a sort of hybrid. The US considerations about protection of women were developed within the UN system, however the US itself was relatively late to adopt own national action plan.

Women as Needy but also Peace Agents, Nevertheless Different (Q5)

Bacchi (2009) outlined three overlapping types of effects that are produced by problem representations: discursive, subjectification and lived effects (question five). The problem representation of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security produces some simple “truths” that have both explicit and implicit effects on establishing the representations of women/femininity in conflict zones. These representations influence not only what can be said and thought about them but also which life opportunities are open to them and which can be closed.

According to the NAP, violence against women poses a serious challenge to national and global security. In the context of conflict and post-conflict “women and girls often continue to be plagued by high levels of violence and insecurity; widespread impunity and breakdowns in the rule of law can contribute to high rates of gender-based and domestic violence” (NAP 2011:6). Therefore, women need to be provided with protection in general and in particular from sexual and gender-based violence: “[c]ritical protection activities including prevention and response to SGBV should be prioritized” (NAP 2011:10). According to the NAP, women and girls may be deliberately attacked and sexual and gender-based violence is a very clear example of that: “[s]exual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and situations of extreme violence is at times deployed as a deliberate tactic for purposes of humiliation, terror, societal destruction, and ethnic cleansing”²⁴ (NAP 2011:6). Ultimately, violence against women concerns the whole families and communities. Rape, for example, is not considered as harm on women only but can further “increase the incidence of HIV/AIDS, affecting not only women but also their families” (NAP 2011:9). What is more, violence against women may be

²⁴ The acknowledgement of sexual violence as a tactic of war explicitly refers to Resolution 1820 (2009). This resolution, for the first time in history, and recognized the use of rape in as a weapon of war (www.peacewomen.org).

“a primary indicator of a nation’s stability, security, and propensity toward internal or external conflict” (NAP 2011:6) because, as the past conflicts show, “societies witnessed rising discrimination and violence against women as early indicators of impending conflict” (NAP 2011:8). For these reasons the status of women needs to be carefully monitored (NAP 2011).

However, women are not to simply benefit from the US policy on Women, Peace and Security, but they have an important role to play in security efforts:

[T]his National Action Plan expresses the United States’ unqualified commitment to integrating women’s views and perspectives fully into our diplomatic, security, and development efforts—not simply as beneficiaries, but as agents of peace, reconciliation, development, growth, and stability (NAP 2011:2).

Women seem to play a special role in security efforts. According to the US NAP:

Deadly conflicts can be more effectively avoided, and peace can be best forged and sustained, when women become equal partners in all aspects of peace-building and conflict prevention, when their lives are protected, their experiences considered, and their voices heard (NAP 2011:1).

Women contribute to the improvement of peace efforts and their presence seems to positively stimulate lasting stability: “[e]vidence from around the world and across cultures shows that integrating women and gender considerations into peace-building processes helps promote democratic governance and long-term stability” (NAP 2011:5). Women’s participation as agents of change should ultimately lead to sustainable peace and security. What is the added value women can bring? As argued in the US NAP, women focus not only on ending the war but also on rebuilding societies run-down by armed conflicts. For them, a peace agreement is not the end but rather the beginning on the way to achieving peace and stability; they have the ability “to include the broader set of critical societal priorities and needs required for lasting and just peace” (NAP 2011:3). What is more, women proved to care not only for their needs but primarily for the needs of their families and the whole community: “[w]omen’s perspectives are important for ensuring that relief and recovery assistance addresses the needs of the entire affected population” (NAP 2011:9). Since women in conflict zones are apparently better-equipped partners in this regard than local men, they have to be protected and included in conflict and post-conflict settings, according to the US NAP.

The US NAP constitutes two main images of women which together form a coherent representation. Firstly, women are defined as vulnerable and needy: they “have distinct needs and vulnerabilities” (NAP 2011:9). As a particularly vulnerable group women and girls suffer most from the consequences of war: “[s]tarvation and disease prey primarily upon women, children, and the elderly” (NAP 2011:6). Women are victims of mass atrocities. They “continue to be plagued by high levels of violence and insecurity” (NAP 2011:6). They are particularly exposed to sexual violence “including rape, sexual assault, mutilation, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery” (NAP 2011:6). They are abused and raped. Therefore, the goal of the US policy is to “protect women from sexual and gender-based violence” (NAP 2011:1). This is, however, “protection of women as agents of peace and stability” (NAP 2011:1). Here we can see a shift from passive victims to the second representation of women as active agents. And what is important, they are still the same women. So these abused and insecure women, although they are the vulnerable victims of violence, when protected and given support, have the potential to become “agents of peace, reconciliation, development, growth, and stability” (NAP 2011:2). Therefore, following Resolution 1325 the US authorities urge to “recognize the crucial role of women in restoring and maintaining peace and security” (NAP 2011:11). According to the NAP “women are the primary caregivers for families and communities in crisis situations”²⁵ (NAP 2011:9) and they “carry much of the burden of healing and rebuilding communities in peacetime” (NAP 2011:5). When women are able to take these responsibilities, they are considered “meaningful participants” (NAP 2011). Furthermore, they have positive influence on lasting peace and long-term harmony, and security efforts are likely to fail if women remain excluded: “[t]his exclusion is as much a blow to peace and international security efforts as it is to women” (NAP 2011:5). The experiences from the past have already shown that “[f]requently, women have held critical knowledge about impending or escalating conflict, but were overlooked or were unable to report their concerns safely” (NAP 2011:8). For these reasons: “[t]he United States is

²⁵ Women as mothers and caregivers could be interpreted as the third image next to women as victims and as peace agents. However, I argue that the image of peace agents builds on the image of mothers and providers to such an extent that it should be analyzed as one: women are peace agents *as* mothers and providers for their families and communities and *because* of that. In other words, they can be peace agents because they represent the interests of their families and communities – as mothers and caregivers.

committed to amplifying the critical role women can play in conflict prevention and mitigation” (NAP 2011:9).

In this representation the traditionally feminine skills based on care and cooperation are revalued and considered helpful in the process of reconstruction and peacebuilding of post-conflict societies. The US NAP implies that since women seem to possess these skills, they should be included in peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. However, at the same time, women have to be educated and encouraged to participate in decision-making. The US Government is eager to “build women’s capacities” (NAP 2011:28), the capacities that seem to be typically of men that women do not have yet but have to gain and combine with feminine skills for the sake of “sustainable peace and security for all” (NAP 2011:2).

The US policy mentions, however, one more representation of women, although completely marginal (appeared once only): female ex-combatants. They represent a distinct category from the women sexually abused and taking the role of peace agents. The NAP actually criticizes mixing these two categories for the ignorance of their separate demands: “[w]omen ex-combatants are often grouped with those who have been kept as ‘wives’, despite distinct experiences and recovery needs” (NAP 2011:10). Female ex-combatants are described as follows: they are “[w]omen who have played a leadership role in a military structure” and for this reason they “are often reluctant to return to the roles that are expected of them when conflict ends” (NAP 2011:10). Although they constitute a separate group of conflict zone women, they also need external support in order to “recover from physical and psychological trauma and rebuild their lives successfully” (NAP 2011:10). The US NAP does not contain information about what “rebuilding their lives successfully” would mean and how these women’s reluctance to their traditional roles could be tackled.

I would argue that in either case women are to some extent victimized: they are the victims of violence or of social, economical and political exclusion; or both. They require external protection in order to become “meaningful participants” and fulfill their gender roles of caregivers and mothers, and they further need a capacity building support to take part in decision-making as peace agents. Even as ex-combatants women need support for “rebuilding their lives successfully” (NAP 2011:10). Moreover, in the whole NAP women are not referred to as individuals: in most cases they are mentioned as a part of collective and traditionally

vulnerable entity: “women and children”, “women, children and the elderly”, “women and minorities”, “women and their families”, “women and youth”, “women, children, and persons with disabilities” and so forth (NAP 2011). Enloe (1990) coined the term “womenandchildren” to describe the representation of women as vulnerable and helpless and to show that in policy documents women are usually associated with children: they are first and foremost mothers and secondly, caretakers, caregivers and providers for their communities. Finally, all these women seem to share common interest and this concern is basically identified with the “democratic” wellbeing of their communities: ending violence and growing stability, which reminds Shepherd’s (2008) critique of Resolution 1325. In the US policy women do not appear to have the interests that could go beyond the needs of their families and societies.

Last but not least, women seem to be represented not only as vulnerable and innocent but also peaceful: their exclusion is “a blow to peace and international security efforts” (NAP 2011:5). Women proved to “have positively influenced efforts to advance security and stability” (NAP 2011:3) and the NAP gives particular examples from Guatemala, Uganda and Northern Ireland (NAP 2011). The need for inclusion of women may be based on the assumption that their presence will result in improving the behavior of their men. Simić shows that in many cases including women is dictated by the assumption that “women’s presence can have a ‘pacifying effect’” on their men (2010:190). At the same time, all the positive impact they can bring seems to be explained in terms of differences: “women’s views and perspective”, “distinct needs and vulnerabilities”, “distinct experiences”, “gender differences” and so forth (NAP 2011).

To sum up, the US policy provides one dominant representation of women. This representation includes two images that are well-combined: women are constituted as vulnerable victims of violence in the need for protection and as actors of positive change, peaceful mothers and “meaningful participants”. Thus, women are not simply to be protected but they have a specific role to play in peace efforts, according to the NAP. They are, nonetheless, constructed as “different”.

Alternative Approach: Norway as the Advocate of Gender Equality (Q4)

An important part of the WPR approach is the reflection upon how problem representations could be thought about differently (question four). Although in this thesis I do not have the ambition to carry out a full comparison of the policies on Women, Peace and Security in the United States and in Norway, this chapter involves the interrogation of the problem representation in *Norway's Strategic Plan 2011-13: Women, Peace and Security* (the NSP). To investigate the Norwegian policy I use the same set of Bacchi's questions²⁶. According to Bacchi (2009), such juxtaposition may be a very fruitful tool for capturing different problem representations and the effects they may possibly evoke. Thus, the analysis of the NSP are involved here with the aim to better demonstrate the specificities of the problem representation in the US NAP. Moreover, since the argument of the strong focus on protection in the policies based on Resolution 1325 is often explained in terms of "the immediate need" to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence, here I aim to show the example that primarily highlights the importance of women's participation.

The United States and Norway are both a part of the Global North and, as depicted before, their national action plans seems to be unexplored at the academic level. Both countries are relatively active in the UN peacekeeping missions and both claim commitment to gender equality and women's rights. It is not, however, difficult to contrast them in many regards. As "Chapter 1" already pointed out, the particularly interesting difference between this two countries would be the conception of the relationship between the state and women/citizens: whereas the US was called masculinist state (Brown 1995) or security state (Young 2003), Norway is consider to be a part of "woman-friendly" Scandinavia (Hernes 1987). And while this relationship seems to be based on protection in the US (Young 2003), it is considered to be founded on cooperation in Norway²⁷ (Hernes 1987). Thus, although the Norwegian and the United States policy documents on Women, Peace and Security claim similar objectives based on Resolution 1325, the two problem representations, as will be shown, differ rather

²⁶ Q4.1 stands for question one, Q.4.2 for question two and so forth.

²⁷ It is, however, not unproblematic to sideline the description of the United States by Brown or Young with the description of Norway by Hernes. Whereas Hernes would probably agree with the assessment of the US by Brown and Young (Scandinavia was yet supposed to be exceptional in the "woman-friendliness") the assessment of Norway would probably be more problematic and tricky for Brown and Young.

significantly. Ultimately, the integration of a gender perspective in peace efforts involves different effects on gender relations.

The problem representation of the first (and only) US NAP from December 2011 is juxtaposed with the revised Norway's Strategic Plan (the NSP) launched in January the same year. The NSP develops the ideas of *The Norwegian Government Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security*, Norway's first NAP introduced in 2006. The decision to compare the US NAP with the NSP was motivated by two main reasons. Firstly, the Norwegian first NAP from 2006 was launched before the UN Security Council adopted the subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010). The Women, Peace and Security agenda as is talked about after the year 2010²⁸, includes all five resolutions (www.peacewomen.org). Just to give an example of what actually have changed since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000: starting with Resolution 1820 launched in 2008, rape and other forms of sexual violence in conflict has been officially recognized as a weapon of war which has serious consequences – both legally but also in terms of the conceptualization of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Secondly, the five-year gap between the US NAP and the first Norwegian NAP would make a significant difference: not only between the political realities in the United States and Norway, but also in regard to the situation in conflict zones that both Norway and the US refer to. Therefore, the juxtaposition of the US NAP with the NSP seems more appropriate. However, I am aware of the weaknesses of such comparison, for example the fact that Norway has been working on the issues of Women, Peace and Security for a few more years and, hence, it may not be fully surprising that the concepts involved in the NSP seem to be better worked out than the ones in the US NAP.

Marginalization (Q4.1)

Although the Norway's Strategic Plan (the NSP) also constitutes a problem representation in close relation to Resolution 1325 and its subsequent resolutions on Women Peace and Security, it differs considerably from the problematization of the US NAP. As we read in the

²⁸ 2010 is the year of the adoption of the last so far resolution on Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 1960.

“Foreword”:

The participation of women in key decision-making processes related to peace and security is a goal in itself. Their contribution is also important in preventing, managing and resolving conflict, and not least in building up societies after conflict (NSP 2011:2).

The change imposed by the NSP refers to the increase of women’s participation in peace processes and in decision-making in particular, which may further contribute to conflict prevention and resolution more generally. This goal will be repeated several times through the whole document: “[t]he main objective of the new strategic plan is to strengthen the participation of women in peace and security efforts” (NSP 2011:2). Although the NSP seems to refer to the argument of usefulness too, and highlights women’s possible contribution to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, national and/or global security does not seem to function as the overriding imperative of the whole document and policy on Women, Peace and Security in Norway. Rather, gender equality as a democratic priority comes first. The main problem is, thus, represented as “[t]he continued marginalization of women in efforts to prevent, address and resolve conflicts” (NSP 2011:6). According to the NSP, the integration of a gender perspective is a tool to achieve a greater participation and influence of women as well as to improve their protection: “to enhance women’s influence and participation and strengthen the protection of women during armed conflicts” (NSP 2011:2).

Women are marginalized and “largely absent from formal peace processes” (NSP 2011:6). This seems to be a general constrain: strengthening the participation of women appears to concern *all* women although the NSP particularly targets Norwegian women. Through engaging Norwegian women at high positions in peacekeeping operation, Norway’s authorities aim to achieve a greater participation of local women in peacebuilding: Norway aims to “increase the number of women peace mediators and negotiators and to ensure that more local women take part in peace processes” (NSP 2011:6). However, whenever increasing the participation of women in conflict zones faces obstacles, Norwegian authorities will “ensure that knowledge of women’s needs and interests is passed on to the main process” (NSP 2011:6).

To sum up, the problem is represented to be marginalization of women. Strengthening the participation of women in peace processes is, therefore, the main objective of the Norwegian

policy on Women, Peace and Security. Ultimately, the argument of usefulness is not the crucial one, in contrast to the US NAP. Although local women are mentioned, the NSP mainly targets Norwegian women.

Participation and Gender Equality (Q4.2)

Following the problem representation of the NSP, whereas the keyword of the NSP is “participation”, the key concept appears to be gender equality. According to the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security women are marginalized and “largely absent from formal peace processes” (NSP 2011:6). The aim of strengthening the participation of women in all peace processes and in decision making in particular, although it may positively impact the international security efforts, is primarily dictated by the goal of gender equality: “[a] better gender balance in Norwegian contingents is a goal in itself; it is also a means of improving performance” (NSP 2011:10). However, as the US NAP did not conceptualize the meaning of security, the NSP does not say much about gender equality though it is a ubiquitous concept within the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security. Whenever mentioning the participation of women, the NSP seems to refer to “the representation of both sexes” (the NSP 2011:7). The term utilized in the NSP relatively often is, therefore, “gender balance” which seems to refer to a numeric similarity in terms of representation. It concerns primarily Norwegian peacekeeping forces and urges to recruit more women: “[t]here is to be an even gender balance among Norwegian participants in peace and reconciliation processes” (NSP 2011:7).

The understanding of gender equality in terms of equal representation is, however, problematic (for example: Squires 2007, Dahlerup 2008). It has been criticized for giving priority to gender/sex while ignoring a set of other issues that effectively impact the position of women. According to Drude Dahlerup such concept “may in a way look like relatively straightforward project”²⁹ (2008:326), that is, it may not effectively address the complexity of gender inequalities. Judith Squires (2007) provides a useful division on descriptive representation that focuses on the numeric composition of women (for example in the

²⁹ This particular quote concerns quota system which is an example of a tool to achieve balanced representation of women and men.

legislature), and substantive representation that refers to “women’s interests”. The pending question is whether descriptive representation achieved by, for instance, strengthening the participation of women in peacekeeping, may entail substantive representation in this regard: Can the Norwegian policy on Resolution 1325 effectively change the situation of women in conflict zones? Will it ensure that the problem of gender inequalities in their everyday life will be properly addressed?

Resuming, while “participation” is identified as the keyword of the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security, gender equality seems to be understood as the main concept. Gender equality is not defined within this policy document. However, it seems to refer to a numeric similarity in terms of representation of both women and men, which may be a problematic conceptualization

Woman-Friendly Scandinavia (Q4.3/4.6)

The context in which the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security has been developed differs considerably from the US situation. Although the terrorist attack of 9/11 has influenced the global politics more generally, it definitely affected the Norwegian politics to a lesser extent than the United States. From the point of view of the policies on Women, Peace and Security, Norway did not react with such a strong security alert as the US did. Instead, Norway’s policy seems to build upon the image of “woman-friendly” Scandinavia.

Equality, and gender equality in particular, seems to be the central value in the whole Scandinavia (Bergqvist 1999). According to a postcolonial feminist researcher, Salla Tuori, “[b]eing good at gender equality’ is seen an essential and inherent part of the social landscape in these countries” (2009:159). The Scandinavian countries are oftentimes characterized by “state optimism as they have a legacy for emphasising equality as an integral part of their political image” (Borchorst and Teigen 2010:20). However, these countries over the last decades have faced an increasing critique for their “gender equality mission”, especially in regard to incoming ethnic minority women and in particular for creating a dichotomic framework of the Scandinavian countries as the ones who already achieved the goal of gender equality, as opposed to the other states (and developing countries in particular) who lack gender equality and need to be taught this democratic value (Phillips and Saharso

2008, Borchorst and Teigen 2010). Norway can be placed somehow in this landscape of “woman-friendly” Scandinavia and its characteristics.

As noted before, the Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were the pioneers in the introduction of the NAPs: they all developed their first national policy documents on the Women, Peace and Security agenda in 2005 and 2006, shortly after the UN call on the Member States encouraging to introduce the NAPs. Also, all these countries have already launched revised action plans (www.peacewomen.org). As previously pointed out, the national policy document of Norway, which is analyzed in this thesis, is the revised document: *Norway's Strategic Plan* which evolves the ideas included in the NAP from 2006.

Gender equality is one of the priorities of Norway's national and international politics. As we read in the NSP, “[w]omen's rights and gender equality form one of the key areas of Norwegian foreign and international development policy” (NSP 2011:5). Norway is ultimately represented as a global supporter of women's rights. Norway, as a successful human rights and gender equality advocate, is eager to provide “support for training other countries' security forces” (NSP 2011:11). What is more, the NSP constructs Norway as a symbol of gender equality. As claimed in the NSP, a better gender balance in Norwegian peacekeeping forces “can also have an important symbolic effect in the host country” (NSP 2011:11). Finally, the dissemination of the problem representation of women's marginalization in peace processes is closely related to the genealogy of this problematization and build on the image of Norway as a “woman-friendly state” and a strong supporter of gender equality.

Resuming, gender equality is presented as the core value of all the Scandinavian countries in general and Norway in particular. Ultimately, Norway was one of the first countries that adopted national policy documents on Women, Peace and Security. Gender Equality is an important part of Norway's international image and the NSP seems to construct Norway as the symbol of gender equality and respect of women's rights.

Women as Sexless (Q4.5)

Although the main objective of the NSP is to put an end to the marginalization of women through strengthening their representation, achieving this goal contributes to peace and

security more generally: “[a] better gender balance in Norwegian contingents is a goal in itself; it is also a means of improving performance” (NSP 2011:11). Therefore, the NSP highlights “the vital role women play in peacebuilding” (NSP 2011:13). According to Norwegian authorities, “[e]xperience shows that women’s participation in peace processes often gives added value and has a positive effect on the outcome.” (NSP 2011:6). What is this added value about in this case? As we read in the NSP:

It has been found that women tend to raise a broader range of political and social issues, help to ensure that civil society and victims are listened to, and generally have a positive effect on the negotiation climate. This increases the likelihood of achieving a lasting peace agreement that takes the interests of the whole population into account and forms a good starting point for building democratic and equitable societies (NSP 2011:6).

Women seem to positively impact negotiations which further improves the chances to achieve sustainable peace. Thus, their participation should be strengthened not only for their sake as individuals but also for the success of whole populations. Nevertheless, this is a secondary goal of the NSP.

The representation of women differs considerably from the US NAP. The most significant alteration is that women in the NSP are not primarily constituted as vulnerable and needy, dependent subjects. In contrast to the US policy, the NSP does not target “womenandchildren” all together: women are not represented as a part of a broader vulnerable entity including children, disabled people or other minorities. Instead, women play a broad spectrum of roles: they are “peace mediators and negotiators”, “former soldiers”, they are further a part of organizations and networks. However, in one line with the US discourse, women can be “victims of abuse” (NSP 2011). Although it is not the overriding imperative as it was in the case of the US policy, women in conflict zones may still need and lack especially in the context of post-conflict: they “often lack protection and security” more generally (NSP 2011:13) as well as “basic services, economic security and opportunities for political participation” (NSP 2011:14). Norway is, therefore, committed “to prevent and protect against sexual violence, promote the prosecution of perpetrators and increase support to victims” (NSP 2011:18) in order to “ensure that women’s economic, political and security rights are safeguarded” (NSP 2011:7), and to guarantee “that victims of abuse and affected local communities are consulted and listened to” (NSP 2011:7). However, while protection mainly comprises sexual violence in this policy, sexual violence affects directly both women

and men, according to the NSP. All the references to the victims of sexual violence in the NSP are gender neutral (though only men are the implied perpetrators since “awareness-raising campaigns” are “targeted at boys and men and their concepts of masculinity” (NAP 2011:18)). Thus, the need for protection does not seem to be women’s domain. Last but definitely not least, men and women are both accountable for the implementation of Resolution 1325: “men at all levels have just as much responsibility for implementing SCR 1325 as women” (NSP 2011:11).

Although women’s participation tends³⁰ to impact peace processes positively and although women may need protection at times, they seem to be constructed as sexless rather than different. The possible positive influence women could have on conflict resolution and peacebuilding does not seem to refer to their different attributes or skills. Women (or at least Norwegian women) appear to be rather “sexless” in the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security and thus, it actually is challenging to characterize them based on the NSP. This strongly resembles the account of Karen Widenberg in which she characterized the Nordic women as “strangely sexless”: “[t]hey just work and work – as if we women lived by and for work alone” (Widenberg in Rosenbeck 1998:353).

To sum up, in contrast to the US policy, women does not seem to be constructed as different. Rather, unequal power relations between women and men appear to explain their different positions (NSP 2011). Thus, women in the NSP are constructed as rather sexless. Although their participation may positively influence peace processes this is not conditional.

Above I aimed to reveal the main concepts underpinning the problem representation of the US policy on Resolution 1325. The set of six questions was used to “read off” this policy and the Norwegian example was involved to demonstrate that the problem could, indeed, be thought about differently. These analyses will be used below for the interrogation of the US policy on

³⁰ It seems to be interesting that according to the NSP the contribution of women’s participation to general peace efforts is possible but not unconditional: “women’s participation in peace processes *often* gives added value”, “women *tend to* raise a broader range of political and social issues” and so forth (NSP 2011:6, emphases added).

Women, Peace and Security as discourse that involves the politics of protection.

The US Policy on Women, Peace and Security as Discourse: Politics of Protection

A policy is a strategic and political process (Bacchi 200). Understanding it as such helps realize why a meaningful change is so difficult to accomplish (Bacchi 2000). In this part the attention is paid to the power dynamics that may hinder a number of changes. Specifically, I examine the main question of the thesis which is as follows: How does the US policy involve the politics of protection?

The Politics of Protection: the Accounts of Brown and Young

The politics of protection were discussed in “Chapter 1”. Brown (1995) described the relation between men and women mediated by the state as an example of masculinist domination. By her account, women sought protection of the state from their abusive men. As a result, the figure of the violent men was replaced by the state. However, the state intervention did not break the pattern of masculinist domination existing before between men and women (Brown 1995). Building on that Young (2003) suggested that the protection provided by the state has both internal and external aspects. Young connected the events of 9/11 with the politics of protection and the concept of security. According to her, the US reacted to the terrorist attack of 9/11 with a very strong security alert and ultimately took the rule of masculinist protection as the main rationale for action, both in domestic and foreign affairs. This logic justified not only limiting the liberal freedoms of American citizens in the name of national security but also the military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of liberating women (Young 2003). The accounts of Brown and Young will be now applied to the analysis of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as discourse.

As typical of the politics of protection, the whole attention of the US policy is focalized on the protected ones, that is, on local women, whereas the figure of the protector seems to be overlooked. Men are apparently missing in this picture. In order to trace the politics of protection as invoked by the US NAP men need to be found in the problem representation of the US Policy on Resolution 1325.

Men/Masculinity

Men seem to be absent in the US NAP on Women, Peace and Security. It turns out, however, not too difficult to find them in the problem representation of the US policy on Resolution 1325. According to Cockburn (2012), while women in the context of war undertake the complex role of caregivers, mothers and peace agents, men can fulfill the obligations of protectors or warriors³¹. However, the gender power relations as implicated by the US policy on Women, Peace and Security are not limited to what individual men and women do but have to be read within the broader framework of masculinity and complementary femininity.

The two dominant images of women in the NAP, the vulnerable, needy victims of violence and mothers, providers and the agents of positive change, did not contrast each other but were rather well-combined into one coherent representation. The representations of men and masculinity appear to be more complicated though the dominant images will be founded on the traditional masculine roles. Men are mentioned explicitly in the US NAP a few times only: either as people (in formulations such as “women and men, boys and girls”), as peacekeepers who misuse their power to abuse the women they were supposed to protect (in the fragments dedicated to sexual violence they are mentioned as “those meant to help [women and children]”) or finally as victims of sexual violence (in this case they are referred to as “men and boys”). The representations in which men are mentioned explicitly seems to be marginal: as will be shown, they do not play an important role for the understanding of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as a discourse: they neither support the problem representation of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security nor contribute to the politics of protection.

Although the dominant images of men/masculinity do not seem to explicitly appear in the US NAP, men’s presence is intended in the policy on Women, Peace and Security. As Connell argues, men’s participation is implied in the documents on women’s rights or gender equality even when they are not mentioned explicitly:

³¹ It is commonly perceived that while men are gone for war, women are “left” with the duties of mothers and family providers. The account of Cockburn may suggest (and I would like to build on that) that this is the other way around and while women take the roles of mothers and family providers, men can go for war.

[M]en are present as background throughout these documents. In every statement about women's disadvantages, there is an implied comparison with men as the advantaged group. In the discussions of violence against women, men are implied, and sometimes named, as the perpetrators [...]. In discussions of women's exclusion from power and decision making, men are implicitly present as the power holders (Connell 2005:1805-1806).

This seems to be the case of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as well. The problem representation of this policy was based on the assumption of women's disempowerment which consequently was a challenge to national and global security: as argued in the NAP, when women are excluded and abused, national and global security is hard to achieve (NAP 2011). Both the exclusion and violence against women that ultimately made them disempowered suggest the existence of violent actors, the perpetrators of these abuses. At the same time, the goal of protection of women and other vulnerable groups requires the presence of security providers. Accordingly, the US NAP may imply two types of masculinity symbolized by two groups of men. In the first group, represented by local men, men are aggressive and abusive. These men are the perpetrators of violence on women. They either abuse or at least exclude women from the decision-making processes. In terms of Young's theory this group ultimately invokes the dominative masculinity. The other group consists of chivalrous men-protectors whose role is to rescue women from the abuse of the violent men. Those men are represented by peacekeeping forces and they invoke the protective masculinity. Although these two representations of men/masculinity coexist within the US policy on Women, Peace and Security, they are (as opposed to the one consistent representation of women/femininity) conflicting, that is: one must be on one side or the other; it is not possible to reconcile these two masculine roles³², as the NAP implies. What is more, it does not seem to be a choice whether they want to belong one group or the other but rather local men are already constructed as the violent ones while foreign peacekeepers as the chivalrous³³.

³² The exception can be represented by the men who originally belong to the chivalrous group (peacekeepers) but for some reason misuse their power and abuse the women they were supposed to protect. These men were analyzed as an example of marginal representations in the US NAP. Minor part of the US policy is dedicated to them. They are treated as "wrong individuals" and hardly ever get attention (NAP 2011).

³³ To be precise, for sure it does not seem to be the issue of choice in case of local men (NAP 2011).

Reading the US NAP very carefully one would actually be able to find an explicit hint to this argument: the NAP mentions that the US peacekeeping forces were involved in a program combating sexual and gender-based violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This program aimed to “engage men and boys in challenging norms and practices that contribute to rape and domestic violence in their communities” (NAP 2011:7). Whereas American peacekeepers (that includes mainly men but perhaps also some women) come to conflict zones to combat the existing abuses against women and sexual and gender violence in particular, local men and boys are framed as the perpetrators of this violence. Local men are further implicitly accused of using women’s bodies as a battlefield: as argued in the NAP, sexual violence in the context of conflict “is at times deployed as a deliberate tactic for purposes of humiliation, terror, societal destruction, and ethnic cleansing” (NAP 2011:6). What is more, similarly to what Willet (2010) claimed, the peacekeepers seem to act as the superior to the men in conflict zones not because they are stronger (although I would claim that in fact they probably are, taking into consideration the access to economic resources), but rather, because they are smarter and able to see “the Big Picture”. Men in conflict zones do not seem to recognize the contribution of women’s participation to lasting peace and stability. Hence, the US Government has to intervene and “[m]obilize [local] men as allies in support of women’s leadership and participation in security-related processes and decision-making” (NAP 2011:15).

Although the NAP implies several images of men/masculinity, the politics of protection produced by the US policy involves primarily the two dominant representations: the perpetrators of violence and the providers of security and, ultimately, the dominative and the protective masculinities. These representations cannot exist without each other: one group constitutes the other and vice-versa. The chivalrous men need the aggressive alter ego to come into being as a positive actor. At the same time, the presence of the evil embodied in the local men legitimizes the military intervention of the United States – and this is the point when the state enters the role of masculine protector.

From Men to Masculinist State... and Back

According to Brown, “[m]ale dominance does not devolve upon single or essential principle, which is why it is so hard to circumscribe and inappropriate to systematize” (1995:178). As

she further claims, what is common to state and masculinist domination is that they both work not through systematized and coherent strategies but rather through “ubiquitousness”: “[n]either has a single source or terrain of power; for both, the power producing and controlling its subjects is unsystematic, multidimensional, generally “uncurious,” and without a center” (Brown 1995:178-179). Since masculinist domination work through this “ubiquitousness”, the logic of masculinist protection may provide a useful framework for conceptualizing it.

As already noted, women could be involved in the role of masculine protector when they are a part of peacekeeping forces³⁴. Masculinity as a concept circulates, and similarly to Cockburn, (2012) I would claim that it cannot be limited to what individual men do. The different masculinities operate within the US policy on Women, Peace and Security at (at least) two levels: individual as well as conceptual. While at the individual level masculinity refers to local men/perpetrators and (primarily male) foreign peacekeepers/protectors, on the conceptual level it relates to the foreign state that enters the role of the security provider (the US). The role of masculinist protector is, therefore, pervading from the male peacekeepers to the security state and back. These two dimensions are constantly constituting each other: the male (and female) peacekeepers are protecting the local women from the abusive men and at the same time the security state functions as the protector of women (and of the vulnerable population more generally since the US NAP also mentions “members of marginalized groups, including youth, ethnic, racial or religious minorities, persons with disabilities, displaced persons and indigenous peoples, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) individuals, and people from all socioeconomic strata” (NAP 2011:1)). The state as the protector is here masculinized, while local women and ultimately the whole vulnerable population gets feminized.

The US enters the role of a positive actor and the provider of security in the light of the policy on Women, Peace and Security. That seems to remind the discourse that was evoked shortly after the terrorist attack of 9/11. As Wibben argued, this discourses about the protector and

³⁴ Although theoretically women could also undertake the role of masculine perpetrators of violence, this option does not appear in the US NAP and does not seem to be implied by it. On the contrary, the representation of women in the NAP as innocent and peaceful discursively excludes this option.

the protected in the context of the aftermath of 9/11 not only justified the military interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq but also constituted the US as a positive actor on the international stage, the chivalry protector who stands up to defend the rights of vulnerable populations, in particular women and children: “[t]he binary framing of the events – constituting the United States as moral and virtuous – was also achieved through the appropriation of women’s liberation to muster support for the war on terror” (2011:108). Women’s rights played an important role in this process: they become instrumentalized and served as “a device for ranking the men of the ‘other’ community as inferior according to their deviation from a putatively normal Western standard”, according to Wibben (Yuval-Davis in Wibben 2011: 108). In the NAP the US is similarly constructed as a human rights defendant with “unqualified commitment” to women’s rights who therefore aims to “advance gender equality and women’s empowerment, ensure respect for human rights, and address the needs of vulnerable populations in crisis and conflict environments” (NAP 2011: 1). However, showing the parallels between the earlier policy on oppressed women in Afghanistan and Iraq and the policy on Resolution 1325, my goal is not to search for similarly deliberate or strategic use of the Women, Peace and Security agenda to achieve desired political purpose. Rather, when analyzing the US policy as discourse I aim to leave out the whole field of intentionality and concentrate on the problem representation and its effects.

Security

Typically, protection does not come without charge. As Brown explains: “the heavy price of institutionalized protection is always a measure of dependence and agreement to abide by the protector's rules” (1995:167). One’s liberty and autonomy must be sacrificed in order to be provided with security. The logic of masculinist protection is based on the assumption of male specialization in security (Young 2003). Also, security is the concept that connects both objectives of the NAP, the protection and participation of women.

Women are not only to be protected and provided with security but they also have the special role to play in peace and security efforts that was previously described: women are supposed to be included as “meaningful participants”. According to the US NAP, protecting and including women as meaningful participants “is critical to national and global security” (NAP 2011:1). Ultimately, it is primarily a matter of national and global security rather than of

gender equality as an objective in itself. At the same time, identifying the universal threat (that is: danger to both national and global security) embedded in conflict zones and embodied in local men, the US Government is able to offer protection to local women.

As previously shown, the US policy on Women, Peace and Security seems to refer to the concepts of state security and human security. Whereas the concept of human security may empower some local women as “meaningful participants” and disempower other local women closing off for them a set off opportunities, the concept of state security empowers the US as an actor in international relations: the protector, the provider of security and the superior. Thus, both concepts may provide rationale for military interventions which are ultimately perceived “apolitical”. According to Heidi Hudson, the use of security as the main argument and the overriding imperative depoliticizes military operations: “intervention is stripped of its political underpinnings” (2012:447). That is, when conflicts are perceived as domestic issues, offering security to the vulnerable population “out there” is seen as “as a purely moral act” which in consequence “closes off [its] political expression” (Hudson 2012:447). A policy aiming to provide security is perceived as a necessary good thing that seems to have no links to realization of one’s political goals whereas it actually may be complicit in putting these people in the position of insecurity.

Finally, gender terms operate in relation to security, according to Wibben (2011). Whereas masculinity is traditionally associated with the provision of security, femininity is usually connected with insecurity and the need for protection. The power dynamics between these two make the relationship of masculinist protection possible. This may further contributes to waging wars. In consequence, the gendered discourse of security may effectively reproduce patriarchy, militarism and insecurity for women (and men) (Wibben 2011).

The US Policy and Masculinist Protection

At first sight, this power dynamics between women and men, and predominantly between women and the state reminds one of the mixtures of the configurations described by Brown (1995) and Young (2003). However, the gender power relations produced by the US policy on Women, Peace and Security appears to be more complicated, perhaps due to the influence of Resolution 1325. As previously depicted, this policy constitutes a couple of images of women/femininity and at the same time implies several images of men/masculinity. The

marginal representations of men (that is: a gender-neutral person, a sexually abused local man or an abusive male peacekeeper) and women (ex-combatant not willing to find fulfillment in traditional gender roles) do not play the important role in the major power dynamics that is overridden by the three dominant representations: abused local women entering now the role of a peace agents partnering the US authorities in the realization of the common security project, abusive conflict zone men not recognizing the contribution of female actors to peace processes, and American peacekeepers-protectors willing to rescue conflict zone women as peace agents. The role of the security state builds on these three representations.

New Women but Old Stereotypes

Whereas the dominant representations of men seem to be consistent with the dominative and protective masculinities presented by Young (2003) (peacekeepers still are chivalrous and responsible, local men violent and barbaric), the construction of women/femininity differs. The representation of women in the field of international relations and peace and conflict studies is traditionally based on the conceptualization of them as the victims of sexual violence which is, also traditionally, committed by men. Ultimately, women are constructed as in need of protection which can be provided by men-saviors. Women constituted within the US NAP, indeed, need protection and security more generally and rescue from sexual and gender-based violence in particular: they are excluded and abused and ultimately disempowered. The US authorities aim, therefore to “protect women and children from—harm, exploitation, discrimination, and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence and trafficking in persons, and to hold perpetrators accountable in conflict-affected environments” (NAP 2011:12). However, these women are not only constructed as passive victims of male violence but also as agents of peace and stability, providers not only for their families but also for the whole society. For this reason, the other goal of the US is not only simply protecting women but also “promoting and strengthening women’s rights and effective leadership and substantive participation in peace processes, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, transitional processes, and decision-making institutions in conflict-affected environments” (NAP 2011:12).

The active role of women in the US NAP as “agents of peace, reconciliation, development, growth, and stability” (NAP 2011:2) echoed the UN Resolution 1325 with its main objective

to increase the participation of women in peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. This role considerably differs from the role of women as implied by the logic of masculinist protection where women were passive victims of violence. It is nevertheless built on the role of women as providers, caregivers and peaceful and innocent actors. Thus, the US policy aims to empower these women but as very particular subjects: caring and cooperative partners, peaceful mothers, “meaningful participants”, who will “carry much of the burden of healing and rebuilding communities in peacetime” (NAP 2011:5). While this representation is opening some opportunities for local women to partner in peace processes, it is at the same time closing off other ones: what if local women do not wish to partner the foreign country that seem to impose its understanding of security? This, however, would remind again the logic of masculinist protection with its division into “good” and “bad” women: according to Young, while “good” women were docile and obedient, happy to be provided with security and ready to obey the protector’s rules in return, “bad” women were ungrateful and refuse the protection putting themselves, as a result, in even bigger danger. However, all women constructed or implied in the US policy on Resolution 1325 are the “good” one. Local women as represented within the US policy do not appear to be given the opportunity to decide about themselves and they do not seem to be unhappy about it. Similarly to Wibben (2011), I claim that not only the victimization and placing women in the position of in need for protection but also the association with peace deprives them of power, denies their agency and devalues their accounts of security. Both these assumptions predetermine the roles that women can undertake in conflict and post-conflict settings. Therefore, although the construction of women in the US NAP differs from the one in the logic of masculinist protection, they still limit women’s opportunities and freedoms.

Local Men as Protectors

Another difference can be found in the representations of men. According to the logic of masculinist protection, men could represent one of two groups: the perpetrators of violence (local men) or the providers of security (peacekeepers) and ultimately conform to one of two types of masculinity: dominative or protective. However, at one point the NAP refers to local men as the protectors (not only abusers) of their women. As written in the NAP

While participating in activities such as food distribution, firewood collection, and travel to and from latrines and water points, for example, they [women] may be

separated from protective family structures and face increased risks of trafficking, SGBV, including sexual exploitation and abuse, or other harm (NAP 2011:9).

The “protective family structures” refer to the role of men as the providers of the security for their women and children. At the micro level it is in line with the logic of masculinist protection in which men act as providers of security for women and children. However, the men mentioned in the quotation are local men who were supposed to abuse their women what actually legitimized the presence of foreign peacekeepers... This fragment pictures women as helpless and deprives them of autonomy and ability to protect themselves. However, at the same time it elevates the local men to the role of the protectors of their families. On the other hand the quote implies that local men, although they may have good intentions, lack ability to protect their women from the enemy. According to Kate Grady in war men’s masculinity may be “called into question by their inability to protect ‘their’ women” (2010:217).

Subversion

The US policy involves the politics of protection and reveals many features of the logic of masculinist protection in particular. Although there are some alteration as those mentioned above, they all did not seem to speak for the autonomy of women. The association of women with peace and innocence as well as assigning them the roles of mothers, caregivers and peaceful agents, although not in one line with the logic of masculinist protection that constructs women as victims only, still deprives them of the opportunity to decide over themselves. Similarly the representation of local men as the providers of security for their women and children, although it elevates the local men, it still constitutes women as helpless, dependent and not able to protect themselves.

Following Foucault, Bacchi and Eveline believe that political subjects are both subjected and resistant toward policies at the same time and individuals are “always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power” (Foucault in Bacchi and Eveline 2010:144). Both power and resistance are productive forces. Resistance does not oppose power in its “nature”; resistance is not a reaction to power. Rather, power and resistance are a relation (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). Ultimately, some potential for resistance can be found in the multiple representations of men which work against the dominant binary perpetrators-protectors. The marginal representations have the potential to weaken the dominant representations of masculinity (and as a result, of femininity) and the logic of masculinist

protection. For example, the representation of male peacekeepers guilty of misconduct undermines the vision of the US as the good actor/protector and shows that within the framework of protection one may need to be protected from the US peacekeeping forces as well. The representation of local men sexually abused by other local men, on the other hand, undermines the vision that only women can be victims of sexual violence and that local men are necessarily aggressive and may not be victims themselves. Meaningful change would build on developing this multiple roles that men and women can play in peacekeeping and security discourses.

In this part I interrogated the US policy on Women, Peace and Security as discourse. Having found men in the NAP I discussed the concepts of masculinity that their presence evokes. The attention was paid to the politics of protection and the logic of masculinist protection in particular. The role of the state as the provider of security was outlined. The last part will discuss the transformative potential of the US policy on Resolution 1325 on gender equality as an objective.

Gender Analysis Procedures

Since the US NAP can be considered an initiative aiming to mainstream gender in the context of conflict and post-conflict, the US policy on Women, Peace and Security may be interrogated as an example of a gender analysis model. In the last part of this chapter I will discuss what influence the US policy may effectively have on the objective of gender equality and the position of women in a long-term perspective: What is likely to change thanks to this policy and what will rather stay the same? The US model of gender analysis will be once again juxtaposed with the model produced by the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security in the NSP in order to compare the transformative potential of these policies.

The main problem shaped by the US policy on Women, Peace and Security refers to women's disempowerment and national and global security problem. They are both deeply interconnected: when women are excluded, security is hard or even impossible to achieve. Thus, the solution suggested by this policy proposal was the integration of a gender perspective. According to the US NAP:

Gender integration involves identifying and addressing, in all our policies and programs, gender differences and inequalities, as well as the roles of women and men. The goal of gender integration or “mainstreaming” is to promote gender equality and improve programming and policy outcomes (NAP 2011:1).

Although the term gender is mentioned relatively often in the US NAP, it does not seem to recall the power relations between women and men but rather refers to women exclusively. “Gender inequalities”, as mentioned in the quote above, seem to be reduced to “gender differences”. Furthermore, “gender” is used most of the times interchangeably with “women” (or with “womenandchildren”): “gender integration”, “gender differences”, “gender-based violence” and “gender perspective” seem to respectively refer to: “women’s inclusion”, “the distinct needs of women”, “violence against women” (and particularly “rape and domestic violence”) and “women’s views and perspectives” (NAP 2011).

In the light of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security, women play different roles in conflict and post-conflict settings due to their “distinct needs and vulnerabilities” and different “views and perspectives”. The US NAP apparently implies that women and men possess different skills and abilities which make them perform better in different roles. Furthermore, women’s role appears to be founded on the stereotypical generalizations associating women with passive victims of violence or peaceful agents of change, mothers, caregivers and providers for their children and communities. The US policy on Women, Peace and Security represents, therefore, the dominant model of gender analysis called by Bacchi and Eveline (2010) “differences approach”. In this model, and in the US NAP in particular, women and men are considered separate categories of people: as previously shown, women have different considerations, experiences and special demands. There is, however, no reflection upon how these differences came about. Instead, they seem to be perceived as the outcome of attributes that women and men possess, though it is difficult to assess whether the US NAP refers to biological differences or social constructions when it mentions “women’s roles in conflict prevention” (NAP 2011:20) or the different “roles of women and men” (NAP 2011:1). Nevertheless, this policy seems to fail in recognizing unequal gender power relations.

The differences model commonly focuses on equal opportunities and the US policy on Women, Peace and Security ultimately aims to create for women the equal access to the existing structures of opportunity rather than transform the structures as such. The NAP seeks

to provide for women “equal access to relief and recovery assistance” (NAP 2011:1), “to political, economic, and social resources and opportunities” (NAP 2011:4), “to legal services” (NAP 2011:7), and so forth. Although women, when having access on equal footing with men, can transform the structures of inequality that seem to favor men, the US policy aims to empower women as very particular subjects, possibly docile and regulated rather than active political subjects. This effectively weakens the possibility that these women empowered as such subjects will reform the structures of inequality.

Finally, the main aim of the US policy is “sustainable peace and security for all” (NAP 2011:2) and the integration of a gender perspective seems to be only a tool for achieving this goal. Bacchi and Eveline use the term “project trap” to describe “tendency to see the goal in terms of effective implementation of a designed policy, leaving the broad goals of the policy outside the scrutiny” (2010:30). According to the authors, in such circumstances that would also be the case of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security, gender analysis is applied not in order to reduce gender inequalities, but rather to increase the efficiency of a particular program.

Whereas the main aim of the US NAP was “sustainable peace and security for all” (NAP 2011:2), in the NSP “[a] better gender balance [...] is a goal in itself” (NSP 2011:11). The Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security has, hence, the potential to avoid “the project trap”. However, while the US policy on Women, Peace and Security was categorized as an example of differences model, the Norwegian policy is more ambiguous. The NSP seems to represent the gender relations model, though at times it shares common features with the differences model, as will be shown.

In contrast to the US NAP, in the NSP women seem to be rather sexless. Although they can be victims of violence (and so can men), they play multiple roles detached from specific gender characteristics. The differences that appear between women and men, according to the NSP, result from “how the different positions of women and men affect their access to and control of resources, as well as their opportunities to take active part in decisions that affect their lives” (NSP 2011:7). The Norwegian policy ultimately pays attention to the unequal power relations between women and men rather than to different attributes of women and

men: as the quotation depicts, the reason for the differences between women and men appear to depart from their unequal positions within the society.

The NSP is, however, not unambiguous in regard to gender terminology. Despite the employment of the term “gender” to describe different position of men and women, the term “sex” also appears in the NSP. For example, when it comes to the participation of women in peacekeeping, the NSP urged for balanced “representation of both sexes” (NSP 2011:7). In the very few cases when “sex” is mentioned, it is used interchangeably with “gender”³⁵. However, neither “sex” nor “gender” is limited to “women” as it was in the case of the US policy. Rather, mainstreaming a gender perspective into peace processes involves the assessment of “consequences they may have for both women and men” (NSP 2011:10). This quotation shows, moreover, that the Norwegian policy is not interested exclusively in providing women with equal opportunities, but also pays attention to equal outcomes. Nevertheless, the focus on equal outcome in the NSP coexists with still strong emphasis on equal opportunities. The very main goal of gender equality is supposed to be accomplished through strengthening the participation of women in all peace processes. It is, however, difficult to assess whether the Norwegian policy aims to transform the existing structures in order to increase the participation of women, or rather “add women and stir”: Norway focuses on providing women with the “access to the legal system” and “health services” (NSP 2011), but at the same time this policy pays attention to the evaluation of effects that it may ultimately have and therefore “[i]nternational operations should be planned, implemented and evaluated from a gender perspective” (NSP 2011:10).

According to Bacchi and Eveline (2010), the approach which focuses on equal outcomes may involve the transformation of the structures of inequality. The approach that emphasizes exclusively equal opportunities may, on the other hand, reproduce instead of reducing the relationship based on inequalities (Bacchi and Eveline 2010). Ultimately, in terms of what Bacchi and Eveline claim, the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security has the potential to contribute to gender equality as a long-term project, while the US policy, on the contrary, could actually reinforce the existing inequalities between women and men in

³⁵ This may actually be an issue of translation rather than imprecision: in Norwegian one word “kjønn” is used to describe both gender and sex (Lempiäinen 2000).

conflict zones. Finally, according to Bacchi and Eveline “if a policy attends only to the immediate practical needs of a woman, it will very likely reinforce the conditions that put her in that situation in the first place” (Bacchi and Eveline 2010:26). Thus, categorizing women primarily as “needy” or “lacking” as in the US NAP reproduces the relation of gender inequality. Therefore, Bacchi and Eveline (2010) encourage to recognize the limitations of such approach and consider gender equality as long-term and a project which always involves “unfinished business” meaning that gender equality cannot be achieved once for good, but it requires continual efforts.

This part discussed the transformative potential of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. The US NAP was once again juxtaposed with the NSP in order to show the different impact these two policies originating from Resolution 1325 might have on gender equality. While the US policy was classified as the differences approach, the Norwegian policy was closer to the gender relations approach. Ultimately, in terms of what Bacchi and Eveline (2010) claimed, the Norwegian policy shows some potential to challenge the existing structure of inequalities between women and men, while the US policy may maintain the status quo unfavorable to women.

Summary

In this chapter I interrogated the US policy on Women, Peace and Security using three different (although overlapping) approaches. The first part employed the “What’s the Problem Represented to Be?”-method and I followed the set of six questions introduced by Bacchi (2009). This part identified the problem representation of the US NAP and reflected upon the key concepts and presuppositions that underpinned this policy. I further discussed the effects that the US policy can ultimately have on women/femininity.

The change that the US policy aims to achieve is empowering women for sustainable peace and security to be accomplished. The problem representation of the US policy is ultimately based on women’s disempowerment that poses a major challenge to national and global security. Women’s disempowerment is further constructed as a two-folded problem: women are abused in conflict and post-conflict settings and they are further excluded from peace

processes. This problem representation is based on the concept of national and global security. The US policy, however, does not conceptualize security but only alludes on both concepts of human and state security. The terrorist attack of 9/11 seems to influence this problem representation although the US policy on Women, Peace and Security is formed in the nexus of the strong post-9/11 security alert and Resolution 1325 with its main objective to empower women in the context of conflict and post-conflict. The US policy further develops the argument of usefulness: women have to be included if sustainable peace is to be achieved. Based on that, the US NAP constructs one dominant representation of women that combines the image of women as victims of violence with the image of women as actors of positive change, “peaceful mothers” and “meaningful participants”. Finally, the analysis of the Norwegian policy on Resolution 1325 is involved to show that the problem of Women, Peace and Security can, indeed, be thought about differently. In the NSP strengthening the participation of women is the change to be achieved and the problem representation is thereby based on the marginalization of women in conflict and post-conflict settings. The main concept that this policy is founded on is gender equality and this seems to be the consequence of the context in which this policy appeared, and in particular the influence of woman-friendly Scandinavia. In contrast to the US policy, the participation of women was set out as a goal in itself and a democratic priority. Although the argument of usefulness appears too, it does not function as the prerequisite of the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security. Women are, finally, constructed as rather sexless: they can play a number of roles. Their participation may, but does not have to, positively impact peace processes.

The second part investigated the US policy on Resolution 1325 as discourse. In this part I searched for the answer to the main research question of the thesis: How does the US policy involve the politics of protection? Is it organized according to the logic of masculinist protection? I started the examination with finding men that seemed to be missing in the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. This was followed by the reflection upon how masculinity circulates between men and the state and how the state enters the role of security provider for women and vulnerable population. In line with Young’s logic of masculinist protection two dominant representations of masculinity were identified: the dominative and the protective masculinity represented respectively by the perpetrators of violence and the providers of security. What, however, struck me to some extent is that the US policy actually emphasizes relatively strongly the need for women’s participation next to women’s

protection. The role of women, nevertheless, turns out to be based on the stereotypical generalizations about women and men in the discourses on war. The space of autonomy remains limited. I further touched upon the marginal representations of men and women that appear in the US policy and that can ultimately have some subversive power. This part ended with a reflection that a meaningful change would involve developing the multiple representations of both women/femininity and men/masculinity.

The final part of this chapter discussed the transformative potential of the US policy in regard to the objective of gender equality. The US policy on Resolution 1325 was once again juxtaposed with the Norwegian policy. The US policy was classified as an example of the differences approach: this policy is based on the assumption that women and men are separate categories of people, though it is not clear whether the US NAP refers to biological differences or social constructions when it mentions the roles of women in the context of war. What is more, this policy produces women as vulnerable and needy and that may as a consequence put them again in the unfavorable position, according to Bacchi and Eveline's (2010) theory. Gender equality does not function as the main objective of the US policy but is rather only a tool for achieving sustainable peace and security and for this reason the policy may fall into the "project trap". Finally, the US policy was found to fail in recognizing unequal gender power relations between women and men and for this reason it may contribute to the existing structures of inequality instead of challenging them. In contrast to the US policy that could relatively easily be classified as an example of the differences approach, the Norwegian policy is more ambiguous, though closer to the gender relations approach. Although this policy does not represent women as fundamentally different, it focuses both on creating for women equal access to the existing structures that favor men and on challenging these structures through emphasizing the aim of equal outcomes. Nonetheless, in this policy gender equality functions as a goal in itself. As the Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security seems to recognize the unequal gender power relations between women and men, it has some transformative potential in regard to achieving the objective of gender equality in the long haul.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of the thesis was to examine the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. The particular focus was on the politics of protection and the main research question was as follows: How does the US policy involve the politics of protection? The other discussed questions were: Is this policy organized according to the logic of masculinist protection? Does this policy produce women as autonomous subjects or rather as docile and regulated subjects? What kind of effects can this policy have on gender equality as an objective? I followed the threefold objective set for this research which was: to “read off” the policy using the set of Bacchi’s six questions, to interrogate the policy as discourse and finally, to assess the transformative potential of this policy referring to gender analysis procedures. Here I recall my main findings and draw concluding remarks that include possible future research on this topic.

The US Policy and Masculinist Protection

The US policy on Women, Peace and Security is a very intriguing case. It was formed somehow in the nexus of the influence of the events following September 2001 and connecting military interventions with women’s liberation, and the impact of the UN Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions recognizing the necessity of women’s participation in all peace efforts. Although on the face of it the US policy on Resolution 1325 resembles the earlier policy on women in Afghanistan or Iraq that appeared shortly after the terrorist attack of 9/11, it turns out to be a distinct case.

When interrogating the US policy on Women, Peace and Security I aimed to trace the politics of protection and the logic of masculinist protection in particular. In my working definition of the politics of protection, based on the accounts of Brown (1995) and Young (2003), it refers to the power dynamics that involve “exchange” of one’s autonomy and freedoms for security. Thus, liberty is apparently traded for protection. The logic of masculinist protection specifically entails feminization of the protected and masculinization of the protector and can, therefore, support masculinist domination. The gender power relations in the US policy on Resolution 1325 appeared to be more complicated. What struck me to some extent was that, as my empirical data showed, the US policy actually elaborates relatively strongly on the need

for women's participation next to women's protection. Women are still constructed as vulnerable and in need of protection, but this policy at the same time goes beyond that. Several representations of both women/femininity and men/masculinity were found in the US policy on Women, Peace and Security but only some were identified as dominant. This policy turned out to be a sort of hybrid. It reproduces the representations of men/masculinity presented by Young, that is the dominative and the protective masculinity involving the perpetrators of violence and the providers of security. However, it further produces a new representation of women/femininity, though based on not-new generalizations. The role of women, although not limited to passive victims of sexual violence, turns out to be based on the stereotypical associations connecting women/femininity with peaceful, cooperative and caring characteristics. Women are ultimately constructed as peaceful agents, that is, mothers, caregivers and providers for their families and communities, "meaningful participants" and actors of positive change. The US policy may be seen as providing women with new opportunities. Nevertheless, it simultaneously closes off other ones. Since women do not appear to be given the freedom of decision about themselves, the space of autonomy remains limited. To sum up, the politics of protection does not exhaust the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. Hence, approaching my empirical data I realized that my leading question "How does the US policy involve the politics of protection?" should maybe have been formulated more openly.

Gender Equality and Stability

As shown in "Chapter 3", the US policy on Women, Peace and Security does not seem to challenge the existing structures of inequalities, at least in terms of what Bacchi and Eveline (2010) claimed. This policy is based on the representation of women as fundamentally different. Gender equality is not the main objective of the policy, but rather only a tool for achieving national and global security. Moreover, this policy further seems to fail to recognize the unequal power relations between women and men. In terms of Bacchi and Eveline, the transformative potential of this policy would be assessed as rather weak.

According to the US policy on Resolution 1325 both the protection and the inclusion of women in conflict and post-conflict settings are necessarily for security to be achieved and can, ultimately, contribute to lasting stability. However, is this stability, after all, good for

women in the long haul? The strong emphasis on women as different may be effectively predicated upon maintaining the status quo based on gender inequalities and further perpetuation of stereotypes about women/femininity and men/masculinity. This also implies, similarly to Resolution 1325 and subsequent documents, that “all women in all conflict areas are in favour of peace and return to the previous social order, irrespective of their differing ideologies, their urban or rural background, their marital status, their religious beliefs, their status as combatants or civilians” (Puechguirbal 2010:181). This, further, results in homogenizing the interest of all local women and identifies it with the concerns of their families and communities. The US policy may, therefore, preserve social order that is unfavorable for women: it mystifies the influence of the policy on the shape of the problem, its appearing and the persistence of gender inequalities. However, what is common to various feminist studies on security is that they all argue that security cannot be achieved until gender inequalities persist (Tickner 1922, Willett 2010, Wibben 2011).

Future Research Proposal: Which Women?

Resolution 1325 addresses the claim “Where are the women?” in the field of international relations more generally and in the studies of peace and conflict in particular. Following Resolution 1325, the US policy on Women, Peace and Security is also a sort of answer to this claim. However, the other question that remains pending seems to be: Which women?

This thesis criticizes the US policy for limiting the space of autonomy for women. Regardless of whether women were constructed as in need of protection or as contributors to peace efforts, in both cases the representation was based on understanding women/femininity as different. The Norwegian policy was shown as a (“better”) alternative: indeed, the problem of Women, Peace and Security can be thought about differently. Women do not have to be portrayed as different but they can well be considered sexless. And indeed, the main focus does not have to be on the protection of women in conflict and post-conflict settings, but can well be on their active participation. The Norwegian policy on Women, Peace and Security was further shown as an example of the gender relations approach which pays particular attention to the unequal power relations between women and men and may ultimately contribute to changing the structures of inequality that favor men. The US policy, on the contrary, was classified as the differences approach which, in a long-term, may reproduce

instead of reducing the existing inequalities between women and men. However, taking a close look at the US NAP and the NSP one could notice not only that these two policies construct the problem of the Women, Peace and Security agenda differently and whereas the US policy focuses on the protection of women and national and global security, the Norwegian policy stresses the participation of women and gender equality. One would further find out that, despite the fact that both policies are based on Resolution 1325, they do not target the same women: I suggested a few times that women addressed by the US NAP are primarily conflict zone women (local women), the distant “Other”. Women targeted by the NSP, on the contrary, are mainly Norwegian women. Would the Norwegian policy still be so transformative if its target comprised of conflict zone women? Or would the US policy be so cautious of the existing structures of inequality if it concerned American women? These are some questions yet to be considered. Thus, here I would like to outline future research proposal based on the thesis.

I hope that this thesis can serve as an inspiration for future research on national action plans on Women, Peace and Security as both presenting opportunities and risks connected with the implementation of Resolution 1325. As mentioned in the “Introduction”, the NAPs of the countries representing the Global North are especially unexplored – and so is the influence of the Global North on the situations in conflict zones. The thesis could be the point of departure for a future study of the US policy on Women, Peace and Security. By no means did I exhaust the possible use of a gender lens to analyze this policy and this national action plan. I would, however, encourage involving a postcolonial lens for future interrogations. Postcolonial take on could provide a very fruitful critique of the racialized discourses of gender. As Wibben argued, if the multiple visions of differently situated women and men are not taken into consideration, “feminism becomes part of the problem, rather than the solution” (2011:14).

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Appendix I

Primary Archive

United States

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325: Recognizing Women's Vital Roles in Achieving Peace and Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session (Congress, May 15, 2008).

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Norway

The Norwegian Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).

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Secondary Archive

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (October 31, 2000)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (June 19, 2008)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1888 (September 30, 2009)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1889 (October 5, 2009)

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1960 (December 16, 2010)

Appendix 2

Reflexivity exercise: count of keywords in the US NAP (US) and the NSP (Norway)

* The number of pages of the US NAP and the NSP are comparable (the US NAP is slightly longer).

Chart 1. Keywords




Chart 2.1 Participation vs. protection (the US NAP)




Chart 2.2 Participation vs. protection (the NSP)

